The developmental continuity of a cognitive model of worry by Zlomke, Kimberly Rae
Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School
2008
The developmental continuity of a cognitive model
of worry
Kimberly Rae Zlomke
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations
Part of the Psychology Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
LSU Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contactgradetd@lsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Zlomke, Kimberly Rae, "The developmental continuity of a cognitive model of worry" (2008). LSU Doctoral Dissertations. 611.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/611
  
 
THE DEVELOPMENTAL CONTINUITY OF A COGNITIVE MODEL OF WORRY 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
 
 
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
Louisiana State University and 
Agricultural and Mechanical College 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
in 
 
The Department of Psychology 
 
by 
 
Kimberly R. Zlomke 
B.S. Saint Louis University, 2001 
M.S. Southern Illinois University-Carbondale, 2003 
August 2008 
 
 
 
ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
Thanks are due to my advisor and committee chair, Dr Thompson E. Davis, III for his 
assistance and guidance on this project.  I’d also like to acknowledge my committee members, 
Dr. Johhny Matson, Dr. Amy Copeland, Dr. Carole Jurkewicz, and Dr. Juan Barthelmy, whose 
offering of time and thoughtful suggestions are greatly appreciated.  
Nobody has been more important to me in the pursuit of this project and my educational 
endeavors than my parents, whose love and guidance has been with me throughout every choice 
I have made and every direction I have pursued. I thank them for teaching me the value of 
education, for their steadfast commitment to my future no matter the financial or emotional 
burden, and for their continual love, support, and encouragement in this journey and all other 
pursuits. They are my ultimate role models. 
Finally, I would like to thank my future husband, Andy, who has provided distraction, 
comfort, encouragement, and the occasionally needed kick in the butt.  He brought a sense of 
balance and calm to my life when it was so greatly needed.  I look forward to our future 
adventures and a long life together. 
 
 
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS....................................................................................................ii 
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................. iv 
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................ v 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1 
METHOD............................................................................................................................... 44 
RESULTS .............................................................................................................. …………51 
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................................................ 66 
REFERENCES ...................................................................................................................... 76 
VITA .................................................................................................................................... 88 
iv 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1. Stages of Healthy Adolescent Development............................................................... 7 
 
Table 2. Demographic Characteristics of Participants (n =153) ............................................. 45 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics................................................................................................. 55 
 
Table 4. Pearson Correlations ................................................................................................. 56 
 
Table 5. Summary Table: Prediction of Cognitive Variables by Age .................................... 57 
 
Table 6. Summary of Regression Analyses for Testing Mediation Models ........................... 61 
 
Table 7. Summary of Regression Analyses for Testing Moderation Model........................... 65 
 
v 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual Model of GAD ..................................................................................... 21 
Figure 2. Mediation Model...................................................................................................... 53 
Figure 3. Moderation Model ................................................................................................... 54 
Figure 4. Model of the Analysis of Avoidant Coping as Mediator Between Age and Cognitive 
Avoidance................................................................................................................................ 58 
Figure 5. Model of the Analysis of Emotional Coping as Mediator Between Age and Cognitive 
Avoidance................................................................................................................................ 59 
Figure 6. Model of the Analysis of Avoidant Coping as Mediator Between Age and Beliefs 
About Worry ........................................................................................................................... 60 
Figure 7. Model of the Analysis of Emotional Coping as Mediator Between Age and Beliefs 
About Worry ........................................................................................................................... 60 
Figure 8. Interaction of Age and Avoidant Coping on Cognitive Avoidance......................... 63 
vi 
ABSTRACT 
 
Research on the construct of worry has increased dramatically in the past two decades. This 
research has also tended to focus on adults, with only a limited number of studies examining 
adolescent populations. With the continued dominance of developmental psychopathology and a 
lifespan approach to development, it has become apparent that downward extensions of adult 
models of psychopathology are inadequate (cf. Mash & Dozois, 2002). As a result, investigations 
in adolescents are essential due to the potential developmental differences and heterotypic 
continuity in worry between adolescents and adults. These developmental differences and 
changes associated with the period of adolescence may affect the presentation of worry and its 
relationship to anxiety and related variables. To this end, this dissertation examined the 
continuity of the components of a cognitive-behavioral model of worry (i.e., Dugas et al., 1998) 
in an adolescent and adult cross-sectional sample of 76 participants.  Assessed constructs 
included including intolerance of uncertainty, negative problem orientation, erroneous beliefs 
regarding the usefulness of worry, and cognitive avoidance. Contrary to hypotheses, it was found 
that age did not significantly predict cognitive avoidance and beliefs about worry. Coping 
strategies, however, did serve as a moderator of the relationship between age and scores on 
measures of cognitive avoidance.  Specifically, an interaction between age and avoidant coping 
was significantly predictive of cognitive avoidance. Implications for the continuity of the 
proposed cognitive-behavioral model of worry and directions for future research are discussed.
1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the addition of excessive worry as the primary diagnostic criterion for Generalized 
Anxiety Disorder (GAD) in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders- 3rd-
Edition-Revised (DSM-III-R; American Psychiatric Association [APA], 1987), the construct of 
worry has received considerable attention in the literature. Most of this attention, however, has 
focused on adult models of worry with occasional downward extensions of these models to 
children and little attention being offered to the developmental continuity of such models across 
the lifespan. Moreover, these downward extensions have often ignored the transitional period of 
adolescence. Due to the many developmental differences present between children, adolescents, 
and adults there is reason to believe that such differences may affect the phenomena of worry as 
well (i.e., heterotypic continuity; Vasey, 1993; Vasey & Daleiden, 1994). The Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-4th Edition (DSM-IV; APA, 1994) delineates worry as the 
primary diagnostic feature of GAD and researchers have often referred to worry as the basic 
component of anxiety in general (Barlow, 2002). Even so, what constitutes “worry” still remains 
controversial, with many definitions and conceptualizations present in the literature (e.g., 
Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & Dupree, 1983; Davey, 1994; Matthews, 1990; MacLeod, 
Williams, & Bekerian, 1991; Tallis & Eysenck, 1994; Vasey & Daleiden, 1994; Wells, Davey,  
& Tallis, 1994)  As the primary feature of GAD, worry has been described as uncontrollable 
thoughts and images with negative emotional connotation (Borkovec et al., 1983). Borkovec et 
al. (1983) continue to describe worry as a primarily future oriented ineffectual attempt at 
problem solving and a maladaptive process for the individual. In this view, worry is a negative 
and maladaptive cognitive strategy. Alternatively, Davey (1994) describes worry as an adaptive 
mechanism and a problem-focused coping response. In this view, worry may serve the function 
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of reducing trait anxiety. These two views highlight the centrality of worry in the human 
experience in that worry may serve both adaptive and maladaptive functions.  
In adult samples, researchers using a cognitive-behavioral model have repeatedly 
demonstrated the influence of four factors on the development and maintenance of worry: 
intolerance of uncertainty, negative problem orientation, positive beliefs about worry, and 
cognitive avoidance (Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur, & Freeston, 1998; Dugas, Freeston, & 
Ladouceur, 1997; Dugas, Gosselin, & Ladouceur, 2001). Intolerance of uncertainty is often 
defined as a cognitive bias that influences one’s perception, interpretation, and reaction to 
ambiguous or uncertain situations (Dugas et al., 1998; Laugesen et al., 2003). In turn, this 
intolerance of uncertainty is presented in the individual’s cognitive, emotional, and behavioral 
reactions to these uncertain situations. Negative problem orientation, as the second component, 
refers to a set of metacognitive processes enacted in the face of problems. This negative 
cognitive set includes an individual’s tendency to view problems as threatening and unsolvable 
as well as to doubt one’s own competence in problem-solving (Maydeu-Olivares & D’Zurilla, 
1996). The third component, positive beliefs about worrying, may be seen as related to the 
function of worry. This refers to an individual’s erroneous beliefs that the worry process may 
have positive outcomes including improved problem solving, increases in motivation, and 
prevention of negative outcomes and emotions (Freeston, Rheaume, Letarte, Dugas, & 
Ladouceur, 1994). Cognitive avoidance, as typically conceptualized in the cognitive-behavioral 
model of worry, refers to an individual’s tendency to suppress unwanted thoughts or engage in 
distraction to avoid distressing thoughts and/or images (Dugas et al., 1998; Ladouceur, Blais, 
Freeston, & Dugas, 1998).   
3 
Four studies have demonstrated significant and unique relationships between each 
variable of the cognitive-behavioral model and worry (Dugas et al., 1998; Dugas et al., 2007; 
Dugas, Marchand, & Ladouceur, 2005; Laugesen, Dugas, & Bukowski, 2003). In a clinical 
sample, Dugas et al. (1998) demonstrated that all four variables contributed to the accurate 
classification of adult participants. In an extension of the Dugas et al. (1998) study, Dugas et al. 
(2005) again demonstrated that all four variables were significantly related to worry and 
accurately classified clinical participants. Additionally, Dugas et al. (2005) reported that 
intolerance of uncertainty was specific to participants with GAD as compared to participants 
with panic disorder with agoraphobia. Dugas et al. (2007) examined the predictive value of the 
cognitive-behavioral model for the severity of GAD diagnoses. Utilizing a clinical sample, 
Dugas et al. (2007) demonstrated that all components of the cognitive-behavioral model 
accurately predicted severity of GAD diagnosis, with intolerance of uncertainty again showing 
the strongest predictive value of the components. After controlling for age, gender, and 
depressive symptomotology, both intolerance of uncertainty and negative problem orientation 
were able to distinguish individuals with moderate and severe GAD (based on clinician rating) 
from individuals with more mild symptomotoloy.   
In applying this cognitive-behavioral model to an adolescent sample, Laugesen and 
colleagues (2003) revealed three of the core variables (i.e. intolerance of uncertainty, positive 
beliefs about worry, and negative problem orientation) demonstrated significant and unique 
relations to adolescent levels of worry. Additionally, Laugesen et al. (2003) demonstrated that, 
when taken together, all four variables were effective in classifying moderate and high worriers 
into their respective groups in a discriminant analysis. Unlike previous research conducted with 
adult samples (i.e. Dugas et al., 1998; Dugas et al., 2005), the variable of cognitive 
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avoidance/thought suppression was not significantly related to worry in the adolescent sample 
reported by Laugesen et al. (2003). Moreover, on an individual basis, thought suppression and 
positive beliefs about worry were unable to discriminate between moderate and high adolescent 
worriers. Although not testing the four component model of worry, Gosselin et al. (2007) found 
that both cognitive avoidance and erroneous beliefs about worry were in fact related to worry in 
an adolescent sample. Gosselin et al (2007) examined specific cognitive avoidance strategies and 
found that only avoidance of worry triggers and thought substitution were related to worry 
whereas only the false belief that worry helps to avoid negative outcomes was associated with 
worry level. These result reported by Gosselin are directly contradictory to those reported by 
Laugesen et al. (2003). Important to note is that these two studies utilized different measures for 
the assessment of both cognitive avoidance and false beliefs about worry therefore result cannot 
be directly compared. Based on these preliminary findings, it cannot be assumed that the worry 
process or the cognitive-behavioral model of worry can be accurately applied downward from 
adults to an adolescent population. 
Discussions of worry across the lifespan have brought up a number of issues relating to 
differences in worry among children, adolescents, and adults. One view holds that as a group, 
young adults are more inclined to worry, based on increased stressors associated with the 
transition from adolescence to early adulthood such as changing family and peer relationships, 
school transitions, educational demands, and decisions regarding careers (McMahon, Grant, 
Compas, Thurm, & Ey, 2003; Williams & McGillicuddy-De Lisi, 2000). In fact, Williams and 
McGillicuddy-De Lisi (2000) found that participants reported that worries grew in intensity over 
the lifespan and, in general, worries were more abstract and future oriented in older samples than 
for adolescents. A second view suggests that worry becomes more prevalent with age due to 
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advancing cognitive abilities, such as the ability to consider future events, threatening outcomes, 
and to elaborate on consequences (Vasey & Daleiden, 1994). This is not unexpected given 
developmental transitions from concrete to increasingly abstract thought throughout childhood 
and adolescence and into adulthood.   
As a result, the purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between age (a 
rough proxy indicator of development) and components of the cognitive behavioral model of 
worry presented by Dugas et al. (1998; 2005). The relationships between age and the variables of 
intolerance of uncertainty, negative problem orientation, positive beliefs about worry, and 
cognitive avoidance will be examined as will the possible mediating or moderating roles of 
coping abilities. To this end, a developmental review of the literature from adolescence to early 
adulthood will be presented, followed by a description of the characteristics and functions of 
worry in adults, adolescents, and children. Finally, literature presenting and testing Dugas’ model 
of excessive worry is reviewed in more detail, including the factors of intolerance of uncertainty, 
problem orientation, positive beliefs about worry, and cognitive avoidance. Finally, literature 
examining the development of coping strategies and age differences in the use of coping will be 
presented. 
Adolescent and Adult Development 
  Adolescence, as a developmental stage, is characterized by changes in biological/physical 
functioning, cognitive development, social roles, and environment (e.g., American Psychological 
Association, 2002; State of Oregon Department of Human Services, n.d; See Table 1). 
Additionally, this time period is full of transitions and periods of change and adaptation such as 
between junior high to high school, high school to college or work, and living with parents to 
living independently (Compas, Davis, & Forsythe, 1985). Transitions during the period of 
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adolescence are typically categorized into three types: normative life events, non-normative 
events (major life events), and daily hassles (Compas et al., 1985). In addition, while adolescents 
deal with physical and cognitive maturation they, simultaneously, deal with changing family and 
peer relationships, educational demands and expectations, and decisions regarding school and 
career (Boekaerts, 1996; Frydenberg & Lewis, 1993; Rice, Herman, & Peterson, 1993). Part of 
this experience is also gaining autonomy, independent problem solving skills, and further 
developing one’s self-concept. These new experiences and encounters force adolescents to adjust 
what they know and how they react to situations. This process of adjustment creates stress and 
anxiety for adolescents during an already challenging time. 
The period of adolescence is also characterized as a time of emotional and cognitive 
development (Ward & Overton, 1990; Mueller, Overton, & Renee, 2001; Larson & Ham, 1993; 
Larson, Moneta, Richards, & Wilson, 2002). Cognitively, adolescence represents a shift from 
concrete thinking regarding what is seen and experienced to abstract thinking regarding thoughts 
and feelings. In the transition from concrete operations to formal operations, changes are seen in 
systematic problem solving abilities, hypothetico-deductive reasoning, meta-cognition, and 
meta-memory (Mueller et al., 2001). During this developmental period, adolescents learn new 
ways to think and process information. Adolescents gain the ability to imagine future possible 
and impossible events and consider multiple outcomes of a single situation as well as other’s 
perspectives and appraisals.   
An adolescent’s social environment also changes during the transition to adulthood. 
Researchers suggest that younger adolescents experience greater changes and stress concerning 
their relationships with parent figures while older adolescents report greater concern regarding 
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Table 1. Stages of Healthy Adolescent Development (State of Oregon Department of 
Human Services, n.d.) 
 
 Early Adolescence 
(ages 10-14 years) 
Middle Adolescence 
(ages 15-17 years) 
Late 
Adolescence/Young 
Adulthood 
(ages 18-21 years) 
 Characteristic Developmental Milestones and Tasks 
Physical 
Growth 
 
* Puberty: Rapid 
growth period 
* Secondary sexual 
characteristics appear 
 
* Secondary sexual 
characteristics 
advanced 
* 95% of adult height 
reached 
 
* Physical maturity 
and reproductive 
growth leveling off 
and ending 
 
Intellectual/ 
Cognition 
 
* Concrete thought 
dominates “here and 
now” 
* Cause-effect 
relationships  
underdeveloped 
* Stronger “self” than 
“social” awareness 
 
* Growth in abstract 
thought; 
reverts to concrete 
thought under stress 
* Cause-effect 
relationships better 
understood 
* Very self-absorbed 
 
* Abstract thought 
established 
* Future oriented; able 
to understand, 
plan and pursue long 
range goals 
* Philosophical and 
idealistic 
 
Identity 
Development 
 
* Vocational goals 
change frequently 
* Begin to develop 
own value system 
* Emerging sexual 
feelings and sexual 
exploration 
* Desire for privacy 
 
 
* Experimentation: 
sex, drugs, 
friends, jobs, risk-
taking behavior 
 
* Pursue realistic 
vocational goals with 
training or career 
employment 
* Relate to family as 
adult 
* Establishment of 
sexual identity 
* Establishment of 
ethical and moral value 
system 
 
Autonomy * Challenge authority, 
family; “anti-parent” 
* Loneliness 
* Wide mood swings 
* Things of childhood 
rejected 
* Argumentative and 
disobedient 
 
* Conflict with family 
predominates due to 
ambivalence about 
emerging 
independence 
 
* Emancipation: 
-- continued education 
and/or work 
-- adult lifestyle 
 
 
8 
academic stressors (Wagner, Compas, & Howell, 1988). Additionally, the nature of social 
relationships and social support develop and change throughout this period (Williams & 
McGillicuddy-de Lisi, 2000). The parent-child relationship is usually affected during this 
transition as peer groups gain importance in the life of an adolescent and young adult. During 
this period, the importance of parent discussions decrease and reliance on peer relationships 
increase. The events that often determine whether an individual is considered an “adolescent” 
versus an “adult” are aspects of an individual’s social environment. Often times, once graduated 
from high school, one is considered to have entered the “adult world” (Arnett & Turner, 2006); 
however, cultural rights of passage into adulthood vary. Along with the transition out of the high 
school environment, living situations are often altered as well as employment status. 
Cognitive development and the ability to anticipate and reason about multiple 
possibilities appear to follow a predictable developmental course that is characterized by three 
stages across the lifespan (Piaget, 1965; Piaget & Inhelder, 1969). Prior to age 7 years, children 
are unlikely to consider more than a single solution to a problem and view the chosen action as 
the only possible solution. At this age, children are in what is termed the preoperational stage and 
their capacity to elaborate on potential negative outcomes is limited (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969; 
Muris, Merckelbach, Meesters, & von den Brand, 2002). However, in the concrete operational 
stage of middle childhood (7-11 years), the understanding of multiple possibilities increases and 
children are able to consider a larger number of possibilities, though these abilities are not fully 
developed (Vasey & Daleiden, 1994). Finally, according to Piagetian theory, the attainment of 
formal operations (age 12 years and on) brings the understanding that some problems have an 
infinite number of solutions. Unlike a concrete-operational child who lives primarily in the ‘here-
and-now,’ adolescents begin to think about more far-reaching problems such as their future, the 
9 
nature of society, and justice, but lack the life experience and judgment to cognitively manage 
multiple solutions and alternatives (Siegler, 1994). Siegler (1994) reported that throughout 
adolescence, an individual grows in his or her ability to examine the environment and the reality 
of a situation from multiple perspectives, as well as, gains the ability to solve problems with 
multiple strategies. During this period of early adolescence, the ability to understand cause-effect 
relationships becomes more developed and a growth in abstract thought occurs. In later 
adolescence and early adulthood, the ability for abstract thought is firmly established and 
individuals become more future orientated, investing in long term plans and goals (Piaget & 
Inhelder, 1969). As a result of this cognitive development, children’s and adolescent’s worry 
may become increasingly complex because of the ability to reason about future possibilities, to 
consider multiple outcomes, and to elaborate on the potential negative consequences (Muris et 
al., 2002). Magnusson (1985) suggested that with the increased reasoning abilities of 
adolescence, a corresponding increase is seen in the ability to consider multiple threatening 
outcomes and to elaborate on the potential negative consequences of such outcomes. 
In Piaget’s theory, formal operations are the end point of cognitive development. Once 
formal operations are fully attained, cognitive maturation is complete. However, like many 
aspects of Piaget’s theory, this view has been challenged and altered by contemporary research. 
Contrary to Piaget’s theory, cognitive development often continues in important ways into early 
adulthood. This research has inspired theories of cognitive development beyond formal 
operations as proposed by Piaget, known as post-formal thinking (Sinnott, 1998; Labouvie-Vief, 
Schaie, & Lawton, 1998; LaBouvie-Vief et al., 1990). Post-formal thinking emphasizes that the 
problems faced in adult life often contain complexities and inconsistencies that cannot be 
addressed with the logic of formal operations. Researchers have reported that many individuals 
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continue to have difficulties with hypothetico-deductive tasks into adulthood (Markovits & 
Vachon, 1990). Abilities linked to the stage of formal operations are often specific to a situation 
or task. Individuals are more likely to think abstractly when in situations they have experience 
with (Lehman & Nisbett, 1990). DeLoache, Miller, and Pierroutsakos (1998) also suggest that 
individuals exhibit different cognitive skill levels and abilities corresponding to knowledge held 
about and experience with different domains. The theories of post-formal thinking take into 
account these findings and suggest that post-formal abilities are often linked to experience and 
include more “pragmatic thought” (LaBouvie-Vief et al., 1990). The idea of pragmatic thought 
suggests that personal experiences lead the way to increased abilities to think in rational, flexible, 
and practical ways when faced with novel situations. 
According to Labouvie-Vief and colleagues (1990, 1998), cognitive development in 
young adulthood is distinguished from adolescent thinking by a greater recognition and 
incorporation of practical limitations to logical thinking. In this view, adolescents exaggerate the 
extent to which logical thinking will be effective in real life. In contrast, early adulthood brings a 
growing awareness of how social factors and factors specific to a given situation must be taken 
into account in approaching most of life’s problems. Labouvie-Vief et al. (1990) argues that 
formal operational thinking is useful when the adolescent has a need to explore and examine 
many life options. However, once an adult has made his/her initial choices he/she no longer has a 
need for formal operations; instead relies upon more specialized and pragmatic thinking. As 
young adults are increasingly exposed to ambiguous situations, their thinking must develop to 
handle such ambiguity. In post-formal thinking in young adulthood, individuals are able to see 
gray areas in addition to the childhood abilities of viewing solutions in terms of right-and-wrong. 
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Labouvie-Vief (2003) also suggests that the developmental period from adolescence to 
adulthood is a time of increasing cognitive-affective complexity. Young adults demonstrate 
enhanced self-reflective capacities that can alter their emotional experiences. In young 
adulthood, individuals become more adept at integrating cognition with emotion and, in doing 
so, make sense of discrepancies in life. Labouvie-Vief (2003) found that from adolescence 
through middle adulthood, individuals gained in cognitive-affective complexity or the awareness 
of positive and negative feelings and the coordination of them into complex organized structures. 
Incremental gains were observed between the ages of 10- to 15- years and from 15- to 20-year 
olds (Labouvie-Vief, 2003).   
Aspects of cognitive development and social environmental changes provide evidence for 
corresponding changes in worry and coping in adolescence and young adulthood. During this 
developmental period, individuals develop greater skills in making inferences about emotional 
states, observational learning, increased awareness regarding available coping strategies, 
increases in problem-solving competence, increasing cognitive maturation, greater meta-
cognitive awareness, and increasing emotional regulation (Eisenberg, Fabes, & Guthjrie, 1997; 
Seiffe-Krenke, 1993, Williams & McGillicuddy-De Lisi, 2000).   
As mentioned above, many developmental changes occur during adolescence: cognitive 
development, increased autonomy, creation of social relationships, and continued emotional 
development. The presence of these factors highlights the importance of separating adolescents 
out for investigations of anxiety and worry and the potential for heterotypic continuity of worry 
over the lifespan. Much of what is known regarding anxiety in children and adults cannot 
necessarily be generalized to adolescents given these developmental differences.  
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Characteristics and Functions of Worry 
 
As presented above, “worry” is a complicated construct that has been conceptualized in 
numerous ways and as incorporating numerous processes, excesses, and deficits. Additionally, 
worry has been discussed as having both adaptive as well as maladaptive features. For example, 
worry has been described as an anticipatory verbal process of repetitive thoughts related to 
possible threats and negative outcomes (Vasey & Daleiden, 1994). MacLeod et al.(1991) defined 
worry as a cognitive phenomena which is “…concerned with future events where there is 
uncertainty about the outcome, the future being thought about is a negative one, and this is 
accompanied by feelings of anxiety” (p. 478). Previous definitions have also referenced deficient 
problem solving in the conceptualization of worry. Borkovec et al. (1983) presented a definition 
of worry which referred to the worry process as “…an attempt to engage in mental problem-
solving on an issue whose outcome is uncertain but contains the possibility of one or more 
negative outcomes” (p. 10). These definitions emphasize the conceptualization of worry as a 
cognitive process, its focus on negative future outcomes, and the role of uncertainty (Laugesen et 
al., 2003).  
In line with the diagnostic criteria for GAD, individuals with clinical levels of worry 
report greater frequency and intensity of worry, more difficulty controlling worry, and increased 
levels of impairment and depression (Menin, Heimberg, & Turk, 2004). Similarly, in a non-
clinical population, high worriers also reported greater mood disturbance (i.e. subjective anxiety) 
and greater perceived impairment (Tallis et al., 1994). In terms of the content of worry, Tallis et 
al. reported that work and academic competency were the most frequently endorsed worry topics 
in a community sample. In a more recent report, Szabo and Lovibond (2002) found that in a 
community sample, 20% of naturally occurring worry episodes were concerned with anticipated 
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negative outcomes. Worry as an attempt at problem solving was endorsed by almost half of the 
participants (Szabo & Lovibond, 2002). Craske, Rapee, Jackal, and Barlow (1989) compared 
clinical worriers with diagnosed GAD to non-anxious controls. Similarities in content were 
observed between the two participant groups, although participants with GAD reported a greater 
number of worries and more worry about illness, health of self and others, injury, and 
minor/daily issues than controls. Other research with clinical samples (GAD) have found that 
worriers have less attentional control and report more negative daydreaming than non-clinical 
participants (Pruzinsky & Borkevec, 1990). High levels of worry were also reported to be 
associated with greater levels of anxiety, depression, and irritability (Borkevec et al., 1983) and 
greater social anxiety than non-worriers (Pruzinsky & Borkovec, 1990).  
Many similarities and differences have been reported across the spectrum of worry, from 
individuals with low, non-clinical levels of worry to individuals with diagnosed GAD and 
clinical levels of worry. Early examinations have suggested that worry is a phenomenon common 
to the majority of adults. Tallis, Davey, and Capuzzo (1994) investigated the construct of worry 
in a community sample. A majority of their sample reported worry occurring on a daily basis. As 
suggested by the Borkovec et al. (1983) definition of worry, participants in the Tallis study 
reported that uncertainty of an outcome frequently provoked worry.  Consistency in the content 
of worry has been reported across groups, with worries regarding performance being frequently 
endorsed but individuals in all groups and the majority of worry topics being self-referent in 
nature (Borkovec et al., 1983; Craske et al., 1989; Tallis et al, 1994). Worries referencing 
physical well-being and “minor” issues are more often reported in clinical samples (Craske et al., 
1989; Tallis et al., 1994). Greater daily impairment and mood disturbance are also reported more 
often by individuals with clinically-elevated levels of worry than individuals with low levels of 
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worry (Borkovec et al., 1983; Tallis et al, 1994). Taken together, these findings highlight the 
importance of understanding the construct of worry, not just for the effective treatment of GAD 
but a better understanding of its impact on individuals across the spectrum of psychopathology 
and functioning. 
 Based on the various definitions and theories of “worry,” worry may serve either adaptive 
or maladaptive functions. Worry has been posited to serve a preparatory function by acting as an 
alarm to prompt an individual for possible threat or danger (Tallis & Eysenck, 1994). This 
adaptive role of worry assists an individual to appraise threatening situations and anticipate 
future problems (Mathews, 1990; Wells et al., 1994). In the definition and theory of worry 
presented by Davey (1994), worry functions as an attempt at problem-solving. In fact, research 
by Davey, Hampton, Farrell, and Davidson (1992) found non-clinical levels of worry to be 
positively correlated with adaptive, problem-focused coping.    
 Conversely, definitions of worry also suggest that it is maladaptive and at clinical levels 
disrupts the actual problem-solving process. Researchers suggest a lack of direct relationship 
between worry and actual problem solving ability, but a strong association between frequency 
and intensity of worry and problem solving confidence (Davey, 1994). High levels of worry are 
reported to be correlated with a negative problem orientation, or an individual’s lack of 
confidence in his/her own problem solving ability and ability to effectively implement solutions 
(Davey, 1994; Dugas, Letarte, Rheaume, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 1995).   
In sum, both adaptive and maladaptive functions of worry have been identified. 
Researchers such as Mathews (1990) and Tallis and Eysenck (1994) suggest that worry may 
serve a preparatory function; alerting and preparing individuals for possible threat. In terms of 
problem-solving, worry has been shown to be related to adaptive problem solving abilities at low 
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levels (Davey et al., 1992) and also to a lower confidence in one’s problem solving abilities as 
well (Dugas et al, 1995). 
Worry in Children and Adolescents 
Despite the fact that worry is a common phenomenon in both children and adults, few 
investigations regarding the worry process or the relationship of worry to other constructs have 
been conducted in adolescent populations. Investigations of worry in childhood primarily focus 
on the content of worry rather than on the process of worry. Much of the published literature on 
worry and the processes involved with the acquisition and maintenance of worry have been 
conducted with adult populations.     
As worry is primarily defined as a cognitive process involving thoughts, it is reasonable 
to expect that a certain level of cognitive functioning must be present for the process of worry to 
engage. Vasey (1993) suggests that individuals must have the abilities to envision, anticipate, 
and conceptualize future events, as well as have to ability to extrapolate beyond what is directly 
observable (Laugesen et al., 2003). As discussed previously, these abilities are present to a 
certain extent in children but become more sophisticated through time and development (Piaget, 
1965; LaBouvie-Vief et al., 1990). Given that worry is primarily defined as a cognitive process 
and that cognitive abilities are known to develop and sophisticate during development, the 
separate examination of worry in samples of children as well as adolescents is needed to discover 
what effects developmental changes may have on the phenomena of worry and its role in 
anxiety. 
In the last two decades, researchers have begun to examine anxious cognitions such as 
worry from a developmental perspective. An information-processing model of anxiety in 
children has been proposed by Vasey (1993). Vasey’s model suggests that anxiety, and 
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specifically worry, be examined within a developmental framework for a better understanding of 
how the expression of the cognitive component of anxiety (i.e. worry) is affected by a child’s 
developmental level. Vasey takes an information-processing model and combines it with a 
developmental psychopathology approach to address the acquisition, maintenance, and observed 
changes in worry content and the worry process in children.      
The characteristics of worry, the actual process of worry, and the role that worry plays in 
pathological anxiety may be dependent on the cognitive development of a child and therefore the 
age of a child, argues Vasey (1993). Cognitive development, including the ability to anticipate 
threat and to reason and elaborate on threatening possibilities as well as memory, language, and 
development of self-concept are all factors that Vasey proposes are involved in worry and 
therefore influence the acquisition, presentation, and maintenance of worry.  One cognitive 
ability with a hypothesized relationship to worry included in Vasey’s model is the ability to 
anticipate future events (Vasey, 1993). Developmental literature suggests that even at the age of 
two years, children possess the basic ability to predict concrete, immediate events. By the period 
of adolescence, this ability progresses to the point where adolescents are able to visualize and 
possess an abstract understanding of the more distant future (Vasey, 1993; Piaget & Inhelder, 
1969).  
Catastrophic thinking is proposed by some theorists to be an important factor in the 
etiology and maintenance of anxiety disorders (Barlow, 2002). Catastrophizing as a thought 
process requires the cognitive abilities of anticipating the future as well as reasoning and 
elaborating on possible future outcomes. Vasey, Crinc, and Carter (1984) found that children 
over the age of five years were able to verbalize the possibility of negative future events and 
consequences. Developmental and clinical literature suggest that with advanced reasoning 
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abilities, adolescents will be able to produce more elaborate and a greater number of possibilities, 
both abstract and concrete (Vasey & Daleiden, 1994). Muris, Merckelbach, and Luijten (2002) 
and Muris, Merckelbach, Meesters et al. (2002) found clear correlations between reported worry 
level and worry elaboration with child developmental level as measured by various conservation 
tasks. In a sample of 3-14 year olds, Muris, Merckelbach, Meesters et al. (2002) found that the 
older participants passed a greater number of conservation tasks as well as reported a larger 
number of worries, more frequent worry, and were able to elaborate more on the potential 
negative outcomes of various situations. Additionally, Muris, Merckelbach, and Liutjen (2002) 
found a significant relationship between reported anxiety levels of cognitive development based 
on a conservation task. Vasey’s developmental model of anxiety suggests that with the 
development of abstract reasoning skills and increased abilities to anticipate future possibilities a 
corresponding increase in the ability to worry is likely. This conceptualization of the 
development and maintenance of childhood worry has been supported to some extent by the 
increased prevalence of problematic worry and GAD as children age (Kashani & Orvaschel, 
1988; Last, Hersen, Kazdin, Finkelstein, & Strass, 1987; Strauss, Lease, Last, & Francis, 1988).   
The information-processing model of worry proposed by Vasey (1993) also considers the 
role of self-concept and meta-cognitive abilities. Studies with adults provide evidence that worry 
is predominantly concerned with threats to one’s self (Craske et al, 1989; Tallis et al, 1994). 
Some evidence exists that this is also true in children. Muris, Meesters, Merckelbach, Sermon, 
and Zwakhalen (1998) reported that the most frequently reported intense worries in a non-
clinical sample of 8-13 year old children were concerns about threats to their own personal well-
being. In this sample, the most common topics of worry concerned school, health, dying, and 
social relationships. Other studies have replicated these results, suggesting that the worries of 
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younger children are primarily self-referent (Vasey, 1994; Weems, Silverman, & LaGreca, 2000; 
Silverman, LaGreca, & Wasserstein, 1995). Vasey’s model proposes the ability to worry and the 
content of worry is impacted by the development of self-concept and an individual’s changing 
perceptions of self, others, and the world in general. According to this model, children of 
differing ages will worry about different topics to varying degrees, with the content of worry 
reflecting the child’s self-perception and current physical and social environment. Vasey 
proposes the content of worry should change as children gain more complex cognitive abilities, 
with younger children’s worries focusing on physical threat and progressing to more 
psychological and abstract threat through time. Content changes with age have been observed in 
children’s fears (Ollendick & Francis, 1988; Ollendick, King, & Frary, 1989) and to an extent in 
children’s worries (Henker, Whalen, & O’Neil, 1995; Vasey et al, 1994; Muris, Merckelbach, & 
Liutjen, 2002; Muris, Merckelbach, Meesters et al., 2002). Vasey et al. (1994) reported that as 
concerns regarding one’s physical well-being and safety decreased with age, corresponding 
increases were seen in worries regarding behavioral, academic, and social competence. Muris, 
Merckelbach, Meesters et al. (2002) found a significant correlation between age and prevalence 
of worry as well as between age and worry elaboration, with older children reporting worrying 
more often, a greater number of worry topics, and increased reports of possible negative 
outcomes. In an investigation with a wider-age range than previously used (6-16 years), Weems 
et al. (2000) found that youth in the higher end of the age range (i.e. 12-16 years) continued to 
report worries regarding their performance and appearance, but additionally reported frequent 
worries about their future and daily hassles.  
Based on Vasey’s (1993) conceptualization of anxiety in youth and LaBouvie-Vief’s 
theory of post-formal cognitive development, it follows that the cognitive aspect of anxiety, 
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worry, will become more prevalent as individuals’ develop more advanced cognitive abilities 
through the developmental period of adolescence. A handful of investigations (Vasey et al., 
1994; Muris, Merckelbach, Meesters et al., 2002) have empirically investigated Vasey’s 
developmental model of anxiety and worry, although the majority of reported samples were 
restricted to those under the age of 14 years. It appears that both cognitive processes such as 
worry and cognitive content such as negative self-talk or automatic thoughts are sensitive to 
changes in a child’s cognitive development. 
The process of worry in children and adolescents, as well as the parameters of worry such 
as number, content, and frequency, has been examined in the research literature. Firm 
conclusions regarding the experience of worry specifically in adolescents cannot be made based 
on past research due to the use of restricted age groups. Based on multiple research studies, it is 
apparent that worry is a phenomena present in children as young as age seven. In a non-clinical 
sample of 7-12 year olds, Silverman et al. (1995) reported that on average children worried about 
almost eight different topics, with the most worries in the areas of health, school performance, 
and personal harm. In general, it appears children in non-clinical samples report the most worry 
about health and safety issues, school, and social concerns (Henker et al., 1995; Kaufman, 
Brown, Graves, & Henderson, 1993; Muris et al., 1998; Silverman et al., 1995; Simon & Ward, 
1982). Children in clinical samples have also reported worry regarding those same areas, but also 
frequently endorse worry in the areas of more social/environmental issues such as war, disasters, 
and the safety of family members and friends (Weems et al, 2000). Older and younger children 
differ in reported worry content, with younger children worrying more about physical harm, and 
older children reporting more academic and social concerns (Henker et al., 1995; Silverman et al; 
1995; Vasey et al; 1994). In addition, older children (e.g. 12-15 years olds) provided more detail 
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when describing their worries (Vasey et al., 1994) and reported a larger variety of worry topics 
(Henker et al., 1995).   
Vasey’s model of worry is supported to some extent by the above conclusions. As 
predicted by his model, differences between the worries of older and younger children are 
frequently reported. These findings provide evidence that worry may be explicitly linked to 
cognitive development.   
Cognitive Behavioral Model of Worry 
Multiple theories exist hypothesizing the maintaining variables for excessive or 
pathological worry (i.e. Barlow, 2002; Borkovec, Davey, & Tallis, 1995). The cognitive-
behavioral model of worry presented by Dugas et al. (1998) integrates many established theories 
of worry into a cohesive, theoretically sound model. A number of studies are present in 
contemporary research literature examining the cognitive-behavioral model of worry and its 
individual components. Unfortunately, although there are a number of studies examining this 
model in adult samples, only one study exists utilizing an adolescent population. The theory 
presented by Dugas et al (1998) delineates four cognitive variables as important for the 
development and maintenance of excessive and uncontrollable worry in adults. These variables 
include: 1) intolerance of uncertainty, 2) negative problem orientation, 3) positive beliefs about 
worry, and 4) cognitive avoidance/thought suppression (see Figure 1).   
Intolerance of uncertainty is often seen in the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral 
reactions of individual to ambiguous or uncertain situations. Intolerance of uncertainty is best 
thought of as a cognitive bias through which individuals perceive, interpret, and react to 
ambiguous conditions (Dugas et al., 1998). The second component included in the Dugas model 
of worry is negative problem orientation. Negative problem orientation is not a specific skill or 
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Figure 1. Conceptual Model of GAD (Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur, & Freeston, 1998) 
 
problem solving ability, but a set of beliefs and cognitive processes activated by an individual in 
the face of everyday problems (Maydeau-Olivares & D’Zurilla, 1996). Included in this negative 
cognitive set, described as a poor or negative problem orientation, is the tendency to view 
problems as threatening, unsolvable, and uncontrollable as well as the tendency to doubt one’s 
own problem-solving abilities (Robichaud & Dugas, 2005a). Positive beliefs about worry are the 
third component of the cognitive-behavioral model of worry. Positive beliefs about worry refer 
to the beliefs that the worry process may be beneficial and that worry has protective and 
preparatory functions of such as avoiding disappointment, finding better solutions to problems, 
and avoiding negative outcomes (Freeston et al., 1994). The forth component of the Dugas et al. 
(1998) model is cognitive avoidance. Cognitive avoidance, as typically conceptualized in the 
cognitive-behavioral model of worry, refers to an individual’s tendency to suppress unwanted 
thoughts or engage in distraction to avoid distressing thoughts and/or images (Dugas et al., 1998; 
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Ladouceur et al., 1998). These four central components of the Dugas et al. (1998) cognitive-
behavioral model of the development and maintenance of excessive worry will be discussed in 
depth below.  
Intolerance of Uncertainty. Intolerance of uncertainty is often described as the central 
component of the cognitive-behavioral model of worry and has shown specific and unique 
relationships with worry levels and the remaining three components of the model Intolerance of 
uncertainty reflects a cognitive bias that affects an individual’s perceptions, interpretation, and 
response to situations deemed uncertain or ambiguous (Buhr & Dugas, 2002). Individuals with 
elevated levels of intolerance of uncertainty tend to react negatively on an emotional, cognitive, 
and behavioral level to uncertain events and situations (Freeston et al., 1994). Additionally, 
individuals with heightened levels of uncertainty view uncertain or ambiguous situations as 
stressful and upsetting and deem such events as negative and needing to be avoided. In the face 
of uncertainty, individuals with an intolerance of uncertainty may be unable to proceed or 
effectively engage in the decision-making or problem solving process (Buhr & Dugas, 2002). 
Intolerance of uncertainty has consistently emerged as possessing a strong relationship with and 
as the best predictor of worry level across clinical and non-clinical populations alike (Dugas et 
al., 1998; Laugesen et al., 2003; Buhr & Dugas, 2006). In non-clinical samples, the correlation 
between intolerance of uncertainty and worry range from .60 (Buhr & Dugas, 2002) to .70 
(Dugas et al., 1997). Additionally, research has demonstrated that intolerance of uncertainty 
makes a unique contribution to the prediction of worry above and beyond age, gender, and levels 
of psychopathology (Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Dugas et al., 1997) and that targeting intolerance of 
uncertainty is related to changes in levels of pathological worry (Ladouceur, Gosselin, & Dugas, 
2000).  
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Previous research on characteristics of worriers suggests that high worriers hold 
heightened evidence requirements for decision making during the problem solving process 
(Tallis, Eysenck, & Mathews, 1991). In this sense, high worriers require addition information 
prior to making a decision. By requiring additional evidence, this lowers the level of uncertainty 
present when faced with a problem or decision. Other experimental research has found that 
worriers exhibit greater difficulty completing ambiguous tasks and are more distressed during 
such tasks than non-worriers (Metzger, Miller, Cohen, Sofka, & Borkovec, 1990). From these 
results, is seems that high worriers are slower at processing ambiguous stimuli and acting in 
ambiguous situations. In a similar experimental research study, Butler and Mathews (1983) 
found that worriers tended to interpret ambiguous situations as negative, dangerous, and 
threatening and that these interpretations were related to greater difficulty in completing 
ambiguous experimental tasks. Experimental research along these lines, suggests that individuals 
with heightened levels of worry have greater difficulty in the face of ambiguous situations and 
often interpret these situations as negative or threatening. Current research suggests that the 
construct of intolerance of uncertainty is also related to cognitive biases in the processing of 
ambiguous information (Dugas et al., 2005). Dugas et al. (2005) found that increased intolerance 
of uncertainty was related to a recall bias for ambiguous stimuli and increased the likelihood of 
interpreting such stimuli as threatening. Taken together with previous research on worry and 
ambiguity, this suggests that individuals who are intolerant of uncertainty have a cognitive bias 
favoring the threatening interpretation of all information, but that this bias is particularly 
important when it comes to ambiguous information, interpretation of such information, and as it 
is related to cognitive, behavioral, and emotional responses to such situations.   
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Targeting intolerance of uncertainty has been shown to influence worry level (Dugas & 
Ladouceur, 2000; Ladouceur et al., 2000). Ladouceur et al., (2000) experimentally manipulated 
intolerance of uncertainty and observed related changes in reported worry levels as well. When 
intolerance of uncertainty was increased through experimental manipulations, increased levels of 
worry were reported. Additionally, during the course of cognitive-behavioral therapy, 
researchers have shown that when intolerance of uncertainty is targeted, worry levels are affected 
(Dugas & Ladouceur, 2000). Overall, researchers show that as intolerance of uncertainty 
increases, corresponding changes in worry levels are observed.   
The positive correlation between intolerance of uncertainty and worry has been 
repeatedly demonstrated. An early study by Freeston et al. (1994) found that intolerance of 
uncertainty was related to trait worry and that the significant relationship remained after 
controlling for reported levels of anxiety and depression. Research in non-clinical samples has 
supported strong positive correlations between intolerance of uncertainty and worry. Buhr and 
Dugas (2002) found that intolerance of uncertainty was able to discriminate between non-clinical 
participants meeting criteria for GAD according to questionnaire data from participants reporting 
moderate worry but not meeting GAD criteria. Additionally, intolerance of uncertainty has also 
been shown to discriminate successfully between participants with diagnosed GAD and 
moderate worriers (Dugas et al. 2001; 2005). Intolerance of uncertainty has also been shown to 
be a construct with a specific relationship to GAD as compared to other anxiety disorders, such 
as obsessive-compulsive disorder, panic disorder, or social phobia (Dugas et al., 2001; Dugas et 
al., 2005). Similarly, Dugas et al. (2001) found that intolerance of uncertainty is most strongly 
related to worry, compared to reports of obsessions, compulsions, and panic sensations. 
Furthermore, although symptoms of anxiety and depression have been shown to be related to 
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reported levels of worry in non-clinical samples, intolerance of uncertainty has emerged as a 
better predictor of worry in both adolescents and adults than either anxious or depressive 
symptoms (Laugesen et al., 2003; Dugas et al., 1997). Overall, it has been found that intolerance 
of uncertainty is a strong predictor of worry levels, even after controlling for age, gender, and 
symptoms of anxiety and depression. 
Although research has repeatedly demonstrated that a significant relationship exists 
between intolerance of uncertainty and worry, the two constructs are hypothesized to be 
theoretically distinct. The relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and worry has been 
shown not to be influenced by overlap with symptoms of anxiety and depression (Dugas et al, 
1997; Freeston et al., 1994). Ladouceur, Talbot, and Dugas (1997) used a series of experimental 
tasks to determine the relationship and distinctiveness of intolerance of uncertainty and worry. 
Information required prior to making a decision on these uncertain tasks was shown to be 
significantly related to intolerance of uncertainty and unrelated to measured levels of worry. 
Using factor analytic methods, Ratto, Sexton, Robichaud, and Dugas (2005) demonstrated the 
statistical distinctiveness of measures of intolerance of uncertainty and worry. The minor overlap 
observed between the constructs appeared to be related to behavioral and emotional expressions 
of worry. 
In terms of the other variables of Dugas’ model of worry (i.e. problem orientation, beliefs 
about worry, and cognitive avoidance), intolerance of uncertainty has been shown to be the most 
salient predictor of worry levels, above other model variables in clinical and non-clinical samples 
in a variety of ages (Dugas et al., 1998; Laugesen et al., 2003; Robichaud, Dugas, & Conway, 
2003). Significant correlations between intolerance of uncertainty and the remaining three 
variables of the Dugas model have also been reported (Dugas et al., 1998; Laugesen et al., 2003; 
26 
Dugas et al, 2005). Although multiple studies exist demonstrating the relationship of worry to 
intolerance of uncertainty in adult samples, only one study has investigated the construct in an 
adolescent sample (Laugesen et al., 2003). Laugesen et al. (2003) demonstrated a significant 
correlation between intolerance of uncertainty and worry in an adolescent sample as well as 
showed that intolerance of uncertainty was the most importance factor in discriminating 
moderate and high adolescent worriers.    
Negative Problem Orientation. Past theories have proposed that the function of worry is 
related to problem solving (Davey, 1994). Worry has been suggested to be an attempt to problem 
solve, and therefore can be a constructive process. However, worry can also be associated with 
pathology and maladaptive responses in the face of real world problems. Problem orientation is 
not a specific skill involved in problem solving but a “generalized cognitive-affective-behavioral 
set that the person brings to specific problematic situations” (D’Zurilla & Nezu, 1990 p. 157). 
Often times, definitions of problem orientation refer to an individual's general response set when 
faced with problems (Dugas et al., 1997) and include reference to problem-solving confidence. 
Confidence in problem solving abilities has been shown to be related to GAD symptomotology 
and worry. Dugas et al., (2005) reported that individuals with diagnosed GAD exhibited poorer 
problem solving confidence than individuals with panic disorder; whereas Dugas et al., (1998) 
found that clinical participants reported less confidence in their problem solving abilities than 
non-clinical controls.    
Negative problem orientation, a component of social problem solving, is comprised of a 
set of meta-cognitive processes that reflect one’s awareness and appraisal of problem’s faced in 
daily life combined with an individual’s ability and confidence in problem solving. This set of 
processes includes problem perception, attribution, and appraisal as well as an individual's 
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beliefs regarding personal control over the problem solving process and emotional responses in 
the face of problems (D’Zurilla & Nezu, 1971). Robichaud and Dugas (2005a) defined negative 
problem orientation as a “disruptive cognitive emotional set, or attitude toward problems that 
includes perceived threat of problems to well-being, self-efficacy, or doubt over one’s problem 
solving ability, the tendency to be pessimistic about the outcome, and low frustration tolerance” 
(pg. 392). Research has shown that negative problem orientation is related to worry (Dugas et al., 
1998) and intolerance of uncertainty (Dugas et al., 1997), and has greater specificity to worry 
than depression (Robichaud & Dugas, 2005b). 
Negative problem orientation and intolerance of uncertainty have been shown to be 
closely related in a number of studies (Dugas et al., 1997; Dugas et al., 1998; Laugesen et al., 
2003; Dugas et al., 2005). Although worry has not been shown to be significantly related to 
actual problem solving skills or abilities, it has been shown to be related to decreased confidence 
in problem solving abilities and low perceived control of the problem-solving process (Davey, 
1994). Negative problem orientation has been related to worry in clinical (Dugas et al., 1998) 
and non-clinical samples (Dugas et al., 1995) of adults. Laugesen et al. (2003) demonstrated a 
significant correlation between negative problem orientation and worry as well as with 
intolerance of uncertainty in a sample of adolescents. In this adolescent sample, negative 
problem orientation was significantly correlated to worry and intolerance of uncertainty, as well 
as with positive beliefs about worry and cognitive avoidance. Additionally, problem orientation 
successfully discriminated between moderate and high adolescent worriers. 
 Positive Beliefs about Worry. According to Dugas et al. (1998), beliefs regarding the 
function of worry play a significant role in the etiology and subsequent maintenance of excessive 
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worry in adults. Researchers have investigated the perceived functions and consequences of 
worry among clinical and non-clinical adult populations.  
Contemporary research has identified a number of positive beliefs about worry 
individuals may hold such as the belief that worry enhances problem solving, increases 
motivation, prevents bad things from happening, protects against negative emotions, and is a 
positive personality trait (Francis & Dugas, 1999; Holowka, Dugas, Francis, & Laugesen, 2000). 
Although studies have demonstrated a relationship between worry and positive beliefs about 
worry, the exact nature of the relationship is not clearly delineated. While some studies have 
found that positive beliefs about worry are related to excessive or pathological worry (Freeston et 
al., 1994), others have demonstrated that positive beliefs about worry were significantly related 
to worry at low levels of worry and unrelated  to worry at higher levels (Holowka et al., 2000; 
Stöber, 2000). Freeston et al. (1994) found that positive beliefs about worry were related to 
levels of worry and individuals with GAD believe that worrying is useful in finding solutions 
and preventing negative outcomes. Similarly, Dugas et al. (2005) found that patients with GAD 
held more beliefs regarding the usefulness of worry than non-patients. Borkovec and Roemer 
(1995) reported that non-clinical high worriers could be differentiated from control participants 
on the basis of rating worry as distraction from more emotional topics.  Both GAD and control 
participants reported that worry was used to compel them to accomplish tasks, to prepare for 
possible aversive events, and to create methods to avoid or prevent aversive events. The GAD 
group recounted greater utilization of worry to divert their attention from more emotional topics. 
Alternatively, Roemer and Borkovec (1993) reported that clinical participants and high worriers 
hold more beliefs about the usefulness of worry in problem solving and in the prevention of 
future negative outcomes than non-worriers. Additionally, GAD patients often claim that 
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worrying helps them to be prepared for negative outcomes, even if these outcomes are generally 
improbable (Roemer & Borkovec, 1993). In such cases, positive beliefs about the functions of 
worry may be negatively reinforced by the non-occurrence of such feared events.   
Overall, research in the area of positive beliefs about worry indicates that a relationship 
does exist between levels of worry and beliefs held regarding the positive functions and/or 
consequences of worry. In a study utilizing an adolescent sample, Laugesen et al. (2003) failed to 
find differences between moderate and high worriers based on responses to a measure of positive 
beliefs regarding worry, although beliefs about worry were significantly associated with reported 
worry levels. Whereas positive beliefs about worry did not distinguish between high and 
moderate adolescent worriers, the beliefs did contribute to the prediction of worry levels. A 
follow-up study by Gosselin et al. (2007) further investigated the relationship of positive beliefs 
about worry in an adolescent sample. No differences in reported beliefs about worry were found 
according to age, though adolescents with high levels of reported worry did hold significantly 
more positive beliefs about worry than moderate or low worriers. Additionally, scores on the 
measure of beliefs about worry made a significant contribution in the prediction of worry. 
Cognitive Avoidance. Cognitive avoidance has been shown to be an important process 
variable of worry in adult samples (Borkevec, Ray, & Stober, 1998; Dugas et al, 1998). Two 
conceptualizations of cognitive avoidance are prominent in the literature. First, cognitive 
avoidance is referred to as an automatic process of avoiding threatening/fearful images and 
reducing/avoiding physiological arousal. Secondly, cognitive avoidance is thought of as an 
effortful process engaged in by an individual to suppress unwanted and distressing thoughts.   
Borkovec (1994) has developed an avoidance theory of worry that examines cognitive 
avoidance and worry in terms of avoiding arousal provoking mental images. In Borkovec’s 
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theory, worry is characterized as a predominately verbal activity, rather than composed of mental 
images (Borkovec & Inz, 1990). Additional research by Freeston, Dugas, and Ladouceur (1996) 
replicated the idea that worry is primarily composed of verbal activity or thoughts rather than 
mental images. . Borkovec and Hu (1990) showed that while worrying, individuals displayed a 
decreased heart rate response when exposed to fearful imagery. This contradicts responses seen 
in relaxed participants and participants without clinical levels worry, who show an increased 
heart rate when exposed to anxiety provoking images. The cognitive avoidance theory of worry 
posits that by engaging in the worry process, individuals avoid exposure to arousal provoking 
images. The result of this process is negative reinforcement of worry (Borkovec, Alcaine, & 
Behar, 2004). Borkovec and Hu (1990) suggest that by engaging in worry, the individual is 
focused on verbal thoughts, rather than the images, and the aversive somatic activity associated 
with the anxiety-provoking images is reduced or avoided. In essence, worry serves as a way to 
avoid images of stressful or negative affectively laden situations and the somatic anxiety that 
might be associated with such situations. In addition, worry is negatively reinforced by the 
success of avoiding these aversive experiences as well as avoiding the physiological arousal in 
the short-term although the long-term consequences are the decreased emotional processing of 
the aversive images and threatening stimuli (Foa & Kozak, 1986). Borkovec’s theory of the 
avoidant function of worry is partially supported by research indicating a reduced variability in 
autonomic arousal in patients with GAD rather than increased autonomic symptoms that are seen 
in most other anxiety disorders (i.e. panic disorder and specific phobia). Autonomic activation 
has been proposed to facilitate cognitive activation (Lang, 1979) and emotional processing (Foa 
& Kozak, 1986). Thus, worry has been proposed as a means of controlling emotional 
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experiences by substituting verbal activity (worry) for more emotionally and physiologically 
arousing visual images.  
A second way cognitive avoidance has been conceptualized is as an effortful strategy to 
suppress unwanted thoughts. At the present, there are limited methods available for the 
assessment of cognitive avoidance in terms of avoidance of fearful/anxiety provoking images, 
therefore the majority of research on the cognitive avoidance in anxiety and worry focuses on the 
role of cognitive avoidance in suppressing distressing or worrisome thoughts.  
Studies report that high worriers and individuals with GAD report active attempts at 
suppressing thoughts relating to worry triggers (Wells & Papageouriou, 1995). Thought 
suppression refers to the attempts and acts aimed at eliminating unwanted or distressing thoughts 
from one’s current awareness (Borkovec et al., 2004). Research suggests that the majority of 
individuals are not effectively able to suppress unwanted thoughts. Additionally, the majority of 
individuals report an actual increase in the number of unwanted thoughts following attempts at 
thought suppression (Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987). Thought suppression is 
thought to have two negative consequences. First, Lavy and van den Hout (1990) suggest that 
suppression of worry may lead to an “enhancement effect,” or an immediate surge in the target 
thought that is activated by a monitoring process induced through the act of suppression. 
Secondly, researchers have suggested that thought suppression may lead to a “rebound effect” 
(Merckelbach, Muris, van den Hout, & de Jong, 1991). This “rebound effect” suggests that 
attempts at thought suppression may lead to the increased occurrence of target thoughts in 
periods following the activity suppression attempt. Based on these two proposed negative effects 
of thought suppression, it is possible that thought suppression of worries may ultimately maintain 
worries.   
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Cognitive avoidance in the form of thought suppression has been shown to be associated 
with levels of reported worry in both clinical and non-clinical samples (Dugas et al., 1998; 
Dugas et al., 2005). Participants with diagnosed GAD have been effectively discriminated from 
non-diagnosed controls using thought suppression alone (Dugas et al., 1998). In adolescent 
samples, there is mixed evidence for the role of thought suppression in the development and 
maintenance of anxiety and worry. Laugesen et al. (2003) reported that cognitive avoidance in 
the form of thought suppression was significantly correlated with worry, intolerance of 
uncertainty, negative problem orientation, and beliefs about worry but failed to find that thought 
suppression effectively discriminated moderate and high worriers or that thought suppression 
predicted worry levels. Adolescent high and moderate worriers were found to differ on reported 
use of avoidance strategies by Gosselin et al. (2007). High worriers reported using each of five 
types of cognitive avoidance strategies more frequently than moderate worriers. The strongest 
relationship reported by Gosselin et al. (2007) was found between worry levels and the 
avoidance of unpleasant thought provoking stimuli and thought substitution. Reported use of 
distraction, thought suppression, and transformation of mental images were not predictive of 
worry levels (Gosselin et al., 2007).   
Although cognitive avoidance is present in adolescents, the relationship of cognitive 
avoidance and thought suppression to worry does not parallel what is seen in adults and certain 
avoidance strategies are more closely related to worry in adolescents than others. These 
conclusions leave many questions as to the role of cognitive avoidance in the development and 
maintenance of excessive worry within adolescent populations.  
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Coping in Adolescents and Adults 
Across the lifespan, individuals deal with a variety of stressors and use different coping 
strategies to address these challenges. The coping strategies used by individuals during different 
phases of development (adolescence, young adulthood, adulthood) are likely to vary with 
cognitive abilities and with the particular life demands and social supports that are characteristic 
of each developmental period. As an individual developmentally progresses through childhood to 
adolescence and even to adulthood, coping abilities are thought to shift from external, behavioral 
strategies to more internal, cognitively focused coping skills (Aldwin, 1994). The importance of 
coping strategies is highlighted in the reported moderating role of coping strategies on 
psychological distress and psychopathology in children and adolescents (Compas, Orosan, & 
Grant, 1993; Kraaij et al., 2003). Coping in general is viewed as an effortful response enacted by 
the individual to deal with external or internal stressors that are determined to be demanding or 
trying (Folkman & Lazarus, 1980). Coping can include both cognitive and behavioral responses 
to the situation and are not always successful (Halstead, Johnson, & Cunningham, 1993). 
Specific coping efforts are the particular strategies used in stressful situations and are 
dichotomized into problem-focused (i.e. efforts to change the person-environment relations) and 
emotion-focused (i.e. efforts to regulate the individual’s stress-related emotional response) 
strategies (Folkman & Lazarus, 1980). Problem-focused strategies are aimed at modifying the 
stressful situation whereas emotion-focused strategies reflect strategies directed towards 
regulating stress-related negative emotions. Compas, Malcarne, and Fondacaro (1988) reported 
that problem-focused coping strategies were negatively related to psychological symptoms in a 
child and adolescent sample. Conversely, emotion-focused coping was positively-related to 
psychopathology. Therefore, children and adolescents with psychopathology were less likely to 
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engage in problem-focused coping strategies and more likely to engage in emotion-focused 
strategies when presented with stressful or challenging situations. 
Several findings suggest that the types of coping strategies used by adolescents do change 
with age. Adolescence is an especially important time in terms of the development of more 
cognitive oriented coping skills. As discussed previously, many important cognitive changes 
occur during the developmental period of adolescence. Cognitive changes observed during 
adolescence include the ability to consider situations in the abstract and in terms of multiple 
possibilities as well as to engage in a type of meta-cognition whereby the adolescent is able to 
monitor his or her own cognitive activity during the process of thinking. The ability to engage in 
meta-cognition or to possess insight regarding one’s own cognitive processes emerges in 
adolescence (Flavell, Flavell, & Green, 2001; Flavell, 1999). Ormond, Luszcz, Mann, and 
Beswick (1991) found that individuals in middle to late adolescence demonstrated greater 
metacognitive knowledge than early adolescence. With these cognitive developments, an 
adolescent is better able to take the perspective of others, plan for future possibilities, consider 
multiple consequences, and provide alternative reasons for outcomes and events (Garnefski, 
Legerstee, Kraaij, van den Kommer, & Teerds., 2002; Labouvie-Vief et al., 1990; 1998). Such 
thoughts and cognitive abilities are important for the ability to manage, regulate, and control 
one’s own feelings. Such abilities assist an individual not to become overwhelmed by emotions 
during or after a stressful experience (Garnefski et al., 2002).  
Multiple researchers have found that there is a significant positive relationship between 
age and emotion-focused coping for 5 to 17 years (Compas et al., 1988; Frydenberg & Lewis, 
1993). Frydenberg and Lewis (1993) found that younger adolescents reported that they directly 
deal with sources of stress by working more or engaging in problem-solving, whereas older 
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adolescents report that they often use tension reduction techniques to manage the internal effects 
of stress. Other research has found that the use of distraction as a coping strategy decreases from 
childhood to middle adolescence (Hampel & Peterman, 2005). These findings are consistent with 
Compas et al.’s (1993) conclusion that emotion-focused coping strategies such as withdrawal 
and the expression of negative feelings increase in frequency throughout development (Williams 
& McGillicuddy-De Lisi, 2000). In contrast, individuals of all ages frequently rely upon 
problem-focused coping strategies that involve concrete actions such as making decision and 
planning solutions to remedy the problem. Research suggests that problem focused coping 
strategies emerge in late childhood or early adolescence and do not appear to change across later 
development (Compas et al., 1993). Williams and McGillicuddy-De Lisi (2000) found that the 
problem-focused strategy of confrontive coping (assertive efforts to alter the situation) did not 
vary across age groups in a sample of adolescents, whereas more emotion-focused strategies (i.e. 
accepting responsibility, self-control) were reported less often by the youngest adolescents 
compared to the older adolescents. 
 Research conducted by Garnefski, Kraaij, and Spinhoven (2001), Garnefski et al. (2002), 
as well as other researchers (Compas et al., 1993; Folkman & Lazarus, 1988; Halstead et al., 
1993) have identified various coping strategies that individuals may use to manage and regulate 
emotions during times of stress. As defined by Folkman and Lazarus (1988) coping includes 
both cognitive and behavioral strategies “to manage specific external and/or internal demands 
appraised as taxing or exceeding the resources of the individual” (p. 468). Cognitive coping has 
been defined as a cognitive way of managing the intake of emotionally arousing information that 
involve thoughts as well as behavior that help to mange or regulate emotions (Thompson, 1991). 
Garnefski et al. (2001) and Garnefski et al. (2002) identified nine conceptually distinct coping 
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strategies: self-blame, other-blame, rumination, catastrophizing, putting into perspective, positive 
refocusing, positive reappraisal, acceptance, and refocus on planning. The strategies presented by 
Garnefski essentially address the cognitive efforts described by Folkman & Lazarus (1980; 
1988). Folkman and Lazarus (1988) identified eight specific coping strategies that encompass 
both cognitive and behavioral facets of coping responses: confrontation, distancing, self-
controlling, seeking social support, accepting responsibility, escape-avoidance, planful problem 
solving, and positive reappraisal.   
Although the use of advancing thought and emotion regulation is universal, there are 
larger differences in the amount of cognitive activity and cognitive content in response to stress 
across age groups (Garnefski et al., 2002). In a cross-sectional study of non-clinical adolescents, 
Garnefski et al. (2001) found that cognitive coping strategies such as self-blaming, 
catastrophizing, and rumination were all important in explaining the relationship between 
negative life events, maladjustment, and depression. A later study conducted by Garnefski et al. 
(2002) examined the use of cognitive coping strategies and symptoms of depression and anxiety 
in both adolescent and adult samples. In a direct comparison of adults and adolescents, the study 
revealed that adolescents reported significantly less use of cognitive coping than adults overall. 
The largest reported difference was found for the strategy of “positive reappraisal,” suggesting 
that adolescents are less likely to attempt to create a positive meaning to a negative life event 
than adults (Garnefski et al., 2002). In terms of the relationship of cognitive coping to symptoms 
of psychopathology (i.e. depression and anxiety), it was shown that a significant amount of 
variance in symptoms of depression and anxiety could be explained by the use of cognitive 
coping strategies. A stronger relationship was demonstrated between endorsed coping strategies 
and symptoms of anxiety and depression in the adult sample as compared to the adolescent. A 
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greater number of strategies predicted anxiety symptoms in the adults than the adolescents 
(Garnefski et al., 2002). A recent study conducted by Garnefski and Kraaij (2006) compared 
cognitive coping strategies across five distinct samples and found that all strategies were 
reported to a lesser extent by the young adolescent sample (12-15 years) than the older 
adolescents (16-18 years). In turn, the older adolescents reported significantly less reliance on 
cognitive coping strategies than the general adult population and elderly sample (Garnefski & 
Kraaij, 2006). Overall, these results suggest that cognitive coping strategies, although present in 
adolescence, become more refined and matured across time (Garnefski et al., 2002).   
Williams and McGillicuddy-De Lisi (2000) examined the use of coping strategies by 
early adolescents, older adolescents, and young adults. Young adults reported use of a greater 
variety of coping strategies, specifically problem focused strategies aimed at directly reducing 
the impact of stressors and strategies that involved a cognitive component (i.e. planful problem 
solving, positive reappraisal). Whereas the strategies of confrontation, distancing, and escape-
avoidance did not significantly differ across the three age groups, the use of planful problem 
solving, accepting responsibility, and self-control strategies significantly increased across the age 
groups.   
Overall, the literature on coping suggests that adolescents and young adults have several 
strategies for responding to stressors in their environment, but that there are important age 
differences. This body of research suggests that as children develop into adolescents and young 
adults, reliance on problem-focused coping strategies remains stable while strategies aimed at 
regulating one’s own emotional state increase (Garnefski et al., 2002; Hampel & Petermann, 
2005; Garnefski & Kraaij, 2006; Williams & McGillicuddy-De Lisi, 2000). Findings suggest that 
adolescents develop new coping strategies that increase in flexibility and range of responses to 
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stress (Williams & McGillicuddy-De Lisi, 2000). The types of strategies that increase in use 
within the adolescent to adult transition tend to have a cognitive component and are more active 
attempts to deal with distress and mange stress related problems as compared to the avoidant 
strategies reported by younger adolescents (i.e. distancing, escape-avoidance). 
Summary and Rationale of Current Study 
A cognitive-behavioral model of the development and maintenance of excessive worry 
has been developed and tested in multiple adult samples. Intolerance of uncertainty, positive 
beliefs about worry, negative problem orientation, and cognitive avoidance are significantly 
correlated to worry and each other and have the ability to predict levels of worry in clinical and 
non-clinical populations (Dugas et al., 1998; Dugas et al., 2005; Robichaud et al., 2003). The 
current study is based on a cognitive-behavioral model of worry as is presented by Dugas and 
colleagues. This empirically based model integrates a number of well-established theories on the 
development and maintenance of worry such as Borkovec’s emotional processing model 
(Borkovec, 1994; Borkovec & Hu, 1990; Foa & Kozak, 1986); Tallis and Eysenck’s (1994) 
model of threat and appraisal, the meta-cognitive model (Wells, 1995; 1999), as well as 
D’Zurilla and colleagues(1990) model of problem-solving. As the cognitive-behavioral model 
presented by Dugas and colleagues incorporates many of the cognitive variables found within the 
previously mentioned models, the cognitive-behavioral model has been able to fill in many gaps 
in the literature, specifically in terms of the functions of worry and maintenance of problematic 
worry within in a comprehensive cognitive-behavioral framework.  Although this model is 
relatively new, a moderate amount of literature has amassed support for the theory in clinical and 
non-clinical adults. Unfortunately, limited research has been conducted using this model in 
adolescents and the research which does exist is not consistent with adult findings. Due to these 
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discrepancies, it cannot be assumed that the development and maintenance of worry within 
adolescents follows what is found in adult samples. Laugesen et al. (2003) demonstrated that the 
variables of Dugas’ cognitive-behavioral model of worry are significantly correlated with the 
tendency to worry in adolescents, similar to findings in adult samples. In contrast to adult 
research, the Laugesen et al. study failed to find predictive value of thought suppression for 
worry levels and reported a lack of ability to discriminate between moderate and high adolescent 
worriers for the variables of positive beliefs about worry and thought suppression. A recent study 
examining the relationship of cognitive avoidance and positive beliefs about worry contradicts 
previous research by Laugesen et al. (2003). Gosselin et al. (2007) reported that five types of 
cognitive avoidance (avoidance of triggers, thought substitution, distraction, thought 
suppression, and transformation of images) were significantly related to the tendency to worry in 
adolescents and were reported at higher levels by high worriers than moderate worriers. Positive 
beliefs regarding the outcomes and consequences of worry were also predictive of worry levels. 
These studies provide preliminary support for the theory that erroneous beliefs about the benefits 
and functions of worry and cognitive avoidance, or more specifically thought suppression, may 
be important constructs for an understanding of excessive worry in adolescents. As can be seen 
within this body of research, the cognitive components of worry do play an important role in 
excessive worry in adult populations and are suggested to play a role in adolescent worry. What 
is currently unknown is if a relationship is present between age and these variables.   
Research in the area of coping suggests coping abilities and strategies are related to both 
age (Compas et al., 1993; Williams & McGillicuddy-De Lisi, 2000) and symptoms of anxiety 
and other psychopathology (Garnefski et al., 2002). In general, adults report a greater variety and 
flexibility in the use of coping strategies. Additionally, the types of strategies relied upon may 
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differ across development. Hampel and Petermann (2005) reported that adolescents reported less 
adaptive (problem focused) and greater maladaptive (emotion focused) coping than children. 
Similarly, Williams and McGillicuddy-De Lisi (2000) found that functional coping decreased 
with age whereas emotional coping increased. Other researchers have also found that emotion-
focused coping increases in the developmental period of adolescence and young adulthood 
(Compas et al., 1993).   
Previous research demonstrates that the variables of intolerance of uncertainty, negative 
problem orientation, cognitive avoidance, and beliefs about worry are important predictors of 
worry in adult samples and exhibit significant relationships with worry in adolescent samples, 
but differences in the strengths of these relationships are presently unaccounted. The largest 
discrepancy in this body of research is regarding the role of cognitive avoidance in the prediction 
of worry. Despite demonstration of a significant and unique relationship between cognitive 
avoidance and worry and the ability of cognitive avoidance to discriminate high and moderate 
adult worriers, these same results have not been replicated in adolescent samples. Given the 
available research on cognitive development across the adolescent to young adult transition (e.g., 
Labouive-Vief et al., 1990; Labouvie-Vief et al., 1998) and the documented increases in 
metacognitive knowledge (e.g., Ormond et al., 1991) and cognitive coping abilities (e.g., 
Garnefski et al., 2002) within early adulthood, it may be that the role of cognitive avoidance in 
the predication of worry changes at some point during the adolescent to adult transition. 
Additionally, research supports the notion that coping strategies change and develop in the 
transitional period between adolescence and adulthood. Consequently, one may extrapolate that 
cognitive avoidance may serve a coping function and account for discrepancies in the literature 
regarding the role of cognitive avoidance in the prediction of worry across adolescent and adults. 
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Past research examining specific components of the cognitive-behavioral model of worry have 
been equivocal on the role of erroneous beliefs about the usefulness of worry in the prediction of 
worry in both adult and adolescent samples. More specifically, whereas Laugesen et al. (2003) 
failed to find support for beliefs about worry in the prediction of worry Gosselin et al. (2007) 
reported that beliefs that worry helps to avoid negative outcomes was significantly related to 
adolescent worry. Given these discrepant findings, further investigation of the role of erroneous 
beliefs regarding the usefulness of worry are appropriate. The present study will focus on this 
issue examining the relationship between age and the model variables as well as the potential 
mediating or moderating role of coping abilities in said relationships. 
Purpose 
The overall purpose of this study was to examine the developmental continuity of the 
Dugas et al. (1998) cognitive-behavioral model of worry. Only one study to date has examined 
the cognitive-behavioral model of the acquisition and maintenance of worry in adolescents, and 
it failed to replicate results found in previous adult samples (Laugesen et al., 2003). Therefore, 
age differences may be present and require further exploration to establish patterns of worry and 
coping mechanisms in an adolescent population. The question of greatest concern is at what 
point in an individual’s lifespan does the proposed model begin to take form. The proposed study 
examined two specific questions: (1) Does age alone predict scores on measures of the cognitive 
components of worry as presented by Dugas (1998), and (2) If age were to predict levels of 
intolerance of uncertainty, negative problem orientation, cognitive avoidance, or beliefs about 
worry, do coping strategies account for or influence the relationship between age and the 
cognitive variables? These questions are of critical importance in better understanding the 
developmental course of worry and how it appears in adolescents. Understanding these factors 
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should help the development of better methods to identify problematic worry and in formulating 
effective treatment strategies.  
Research Hypotheses 
1. Hypothesis: It was predicted that scores on measures of cognitive avoidance and 
beliefs about worry would be positively predicted by age, whereas measures of intolerance of 
uncertainty and problem orientation would not be predicted by or correlated with age. Given the 
conflicting results reported in research with adult (e.g. Dugas et al., 1998; Dugas et al., 2005; 
Dugas et al., 2007) and adolescent (e.g. Laugesen et al., 2003; Gosselin et al., 2007) samples, it 
was predicted that cognitive avoidance and beliefs about worry would be predicted by age in that 
with increasing age, increased reports of cognitive avoidance and erroneous beliefs about worry 
would result. However, previous research with adults and adolescents has yielded consistent 
results regarding the relationship of intolerance of uncertainty and problem orientation with 
worry in both adolescent and adult samples. Therefore, a relationship between age and scores on 
measures of intolerance of uncertainty and problem orientation are not expected to be found. 
2. Hypothesis: It was predicted that use of coping strategies would serve as a moderator 
of the relationship between age and scores on measures of cognitive avoidance and positive 
beliefs about worry rather than mediating the relationships. It was hypothesized that coping 
(specifically avoidant/emotional coping) will accentuate the relationship between age and 
cognitive avoidance/beliefs about worry but coping will not account for these relationships. 
More specifically, it was hypothesized that the relationship between age and the cognitive 
variables of cognitive avoidance and beliefs about worry will be greater at lower levels of 
reported coping than at higher levels of coping. In other words, it was predicted that age would 
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predict cognitive avoidance and beliefs about worry, but only in individuals who report lower 
degrees of coping.   
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METHOD 
Participants 
 
Chase and Tucker (1976) recommended that in behavioral sciences, for research with an 
a priori level of significance (α) of .05, power should be set at .80. Using GPOWER, a power 
analysis computer program (Erdfelder, Faul & Buchner, 1996), a sample of 77 participants was 
shown to be optimal to achieve a power of .80, using a medium effect size. The present study 
included 153 participants, which is a sufficient number to detect significant results, should such 
relationships exist. 
Seventy-six adolescents between the ages of 12 and 18 (grades 6-12) and 77 young adults 
between the ages of 18 and 24 participated in this study. Participants had a mean age of 18.53 
years (SD=3.14, range 12-24 years). The current sample included thirty-seven males (24%) and 
116 females (76%). The sample consisted of 128 Caucasian participants (84%), 14 African 
American participants (9%), and 11 participants who identified their race as “Other” (7%). 
Stratified random sampling was used to select 18-24 year-old participants from a larger sample 
of approximately 1,200 participants enrolled at Louisiana State University (LSU). Chi square 
analyses were conducted to compare the demographic make-up of the samples across the two 
recruitment sites.  Male and female participants were equally distributed across the recruitment 
sites, x2 (1)=.02, p >.05.  The racial distribution of the sample did differ by recruitment site, x2 
(2)=.9.082, p <.05; with a greater number of Caucasian participants enrolled from high schools. 
See Table 2 for demographic characteristics of all participants.  
Materials 
 All study instruments were administered in an on-line format. Permission to reproduce 
and use all instruments in an online format was obtained. The following questionnaires 
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Table 2. Demographic Characteristics of Participants (n =153) 
 
  N % 
Age 12 
13 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
8 
4 
14 
8 
28 
25 
11 
11 
11 
11 
11 
11 
5.2 
2.6 
9.2 
5.2 
18.3 
16.3 
7.2 
7.2 
7.2 
7.2 
7.2 
7.2 
Gender Male 
Female 
37 
116 
24.2 
75.8 
Race African-American 
Caucasian 
Other 
14 
128 
11 
9.2 
83.7 
7.2 
 
 
were utilized in this study and are described below: 
• Cognitive Avoidance Questionnaire (CAQ; Sexton, Duags, & Hedayati, 2004) 
• Coping Orientations to Problems Experienced Scale (COPE; Carver, Scheier, & 
Weintraub, 1989) 
• Demographic Questionnaire 
• Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Freeston et al., 1994) 
• Negative Problem Orientation Questionnaire (NPOQ; Robichaud & Dugas, 
2005a; 2005b) 
• Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 
1990) 
• Why Worry-II (WW-II; Holowka et al., 2000) 
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Cognitive Avoidance Questionnaire (CAQ; Sexton, Dugas, & Hedayati, 2004; see 
Appendix A). Although the White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI; Wegner & Zanakos, 
1994) has most often been used to examine the construct of cognitive avoidance in tests of the 
cognitive-behavioral model of worry (Dugas et al., 1998; Robichaud et al., 2003; Laugesen et al., 
2003), more recent research has utilized the CAQ (Dugas et al., 2005; Dugas et al., 2007). As 
opposed to the WBSI, which primarily assesses the cognitive avoidance strategy of thought 
suppression, the CAQ assesses five distinct strategies. The CAQ contains 25 items to assess for 
the tendency to use five cognitive avoidance strategies such as thought suppression, thought 
substitution, transformation of images into verbal thoughts, avoidance of stimuli that trigger 
unpleasant thoughts, and distraction in the face of bothersome or aversive thoughts. The CAQ is 
scored on a five-point Likert scale (1= not at all typical, 5= completely typical). Research has 
typically employed the CAQ overall scale score in analyses and has supported the reliability and 
validity of the instrument in adolescent samples (Gosselin et al., 2007; Sexton & Dugas, in press; 
Sexton et al., 2004;). The CAQ has demonstrated excellent internal consistency (α = .92-.95) and 
good test-retest reliability (r=.81). Additionally, the CAQ has shown evidence of convergent and 
criterion-related validity (Sexton et al., 2004; Gosselin et al, 2007). Given that the goals of the 
present study did not include an examination of specific types of cognitive avoidance and the 
inter-correlation of individual scales (Gosselin et al., 2007), only the CAQ total scale score was 
retained for use in statistical analyses. 
Coping Orientations to Problems Experienced Scale (COPE; Carver et al., 1989; See 
Appendix B). The COPE is a 60-item questionnaire assessing thoughts and actions individuals 
use to cope with daily hassles encountered during everyday life. The COPE has been used 
extensively in various clinical and research settings to assess specific coping styles and 
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behaviors. Participants indicate the frequency with which each of the 60 coping strategies is 
used. In the original psychometric report, 13 subscales summarize the relative use of cognitive 
and emotional coping strategies (Carver et al., 1989). Acceptable internal consistency has been 
reported in a number of studies and convergent and divergent validity have been shown to be 
adequate (Carver et al., 1989). Measures assessing coping styles have historically demonstrated 
less than ideal psychometric properties (i.e. large number of factors, poor reliability). Lynne and 
Roger (2000) conducted a reanalysis of the COPE and proposed a new scoring key and factor 
structure for the COPE. Utilizing item level analyses, Lyne and Roger (2000) arrived at a three 
factor solution. The factors that emerged included Active Coping, Avoidant Coping, and 
Emotional Coping. Cronbach’s alpha estimates of internal consistency were in the adequate 
range (α=.89, α =.83, α=.69 respectively). Convergent and divergent validity were reported by 
Lyne and Roger (2000), with correlations between new COPE subscales and indices of health 
and psychological distress in expected directions. In the current study, participants were 
administered the COPE to assess the use of emotional and avoidant coping strategies in the face 
of everyday life stressors.   
Demographic Questionnaire (see Appendix C). For purposes of the present study, a 
questionnaire was developed which probes typical demographic areas (e.g., name, age, grade, 
race, gender, SES). This questionnaire was administered online to all participants to gather 
general information on demographic variables that may contribute to between group differences. 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Freeston et al., 1994; see Appendix D). The IUS 
is a 27-item instrument assessing ideas held by an individual that uncertainty in life is 
unacceptable, reflects badly, and leads to frustration. Sample items include, “I can’t stand being 
undecided about my future” and “One should always look ahead so as to avoid surprises.” All 
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items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (not at all characteristic of me) to 5 (entirely 
characteristic of me). The IUS shows excellent internal (α =.91) and good test-retest reliability 
(r=.78; Dugas et al., 1997). Additionally, the IUS has demonstrated acceptable convergent and 
divergent validity as it is more highly related to other measures of worry than to measures of 
obsessions or panic (Dugas et al., 2001). Only one study has examined the IUS in an adolescent 
sample; Laugesen et al. (2003) reported internal consistency of the IUS in an adolescent sample 
of α =.92.  
Negative Problem Orientation Questionnaire (NPOQ; Robichaud & Dugas, 2005a; 
2005b; see Appendix E). The NPOQ is a 12-item questionnaire of negative beliefs regarding 
one’s problem solving ability. The NPOQ assesses an individual’s tendency to see problem 
situations as threatening, doubt their problem-solving abilities, and be pessimistic about the 
outcome of the problem solving process. Reported internal consistency of the NPOQ is excellent 
(α=.90) with adequate convergent and discriminant validity (Gosselin et al., 2007).  
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990; 
see Appendix F). The PSQW is a 16-item self-report of excessive and uncontrollable worry in 
adults. Item examples include, “My worries really bother me” and “I know I shouldn’t worry but 
I just can’t help it.” All items are rated in a five-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (not at all 
typical of me) to 5 (very typical of me). The PSWQ possess good internal consistency, α = .86-
.95, and test-retest reliability, r=.74-.93 (Molina & Borkovec, 1994). Additionally, research has 
demonstrated that the PSWQ has good convergent and divergent validity (Molina & Borkovec, 
1994). Gosselin et al. (2007) reported support for the use of the PSWQ in an adolescent sample.   
 Why Worry-II (WW-II; Holowka et al., 2000; see Appendix G). The WW-II is a 25-
item questionnaire of positive beliefs about worry. All items are rated on a 5-point Likert type 
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scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). An example item from the WW-II is “By 
worrying, I can find a better way to do things?” Five factors emerge suggesting five types of 
beliefs regarding worry including 1) worry as an aid to problem solving, 2) worry as a source of 
motivation, 3) worry as a way of preventing negative emotion, 4) worry as a way of preventing 
negative outcomes, and 5) worry as a positive personality trait. The WW-II demonstrates high 
internal consistency and adequate validity and reliability (Freeston et al., 1994; Dugas et al., 
1995). Excellent internal consistency was reported by Laugesen et al. (2003) in an adolescent 
sample (α =.90). Given that the goals of the present study did not include an examination of 
specific types of beliefs about worry and the inter-correlation of individual scales, only the WW-
II total scale score was retained for use in statistical analyses.   
General Procedures 
 
Adolescent Recruitment and Procedures. The LSU Office of Admissions provided a 
list of the Baton Rouge middle and high schools typically found to have students graduate and 
enroll at LSU. Four schools in the Baton Rouge area from this list were approached for 
participation in the current study. Two schools agreed to participate and meetings were 
conducted with school administration to discuss the details of the study. A letter explaining the 
purpose and risks of the study was sent to parents/guardians of eligible participants (i.e. enrolled 
in grades 6-12 at participating schools; see Appendix H). Parents providing consent for their 
adolescent’s participation returned a signed copy of the informed consent along with a valid 
email address to the investigator at a designated local school location. Once informed consent 
had been obtained from the parent/guardian, the adolescent was emailed instructions for the on-
line survey and a link to the website containing the survey. Assent from individual adolescent 
participants was obtained through the on-line survey (see Appendix I). Adolescents were able to 
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complete the survey on-line at their leisure prior to a specified date. Participants specified their 
homeroom class when completing the survey and the homeroom class with the highest 
percentage of responses for each grade and school received a pizza party following the 
completion of data collection. 
Young Adult Recruitment and Procedures. LSU undergraduate students enrolled in 
psychology courses offering extra credit were able to sign up for the experiment using the PSYC 
Experiments web-based server. Participants completed the informed consent via the on-line 
survey (see Appendix J). By clicking ‘I Agree’ and entering their name, participants 
acknowledged receipt and provision of informed consent for participation in this study. 
Following completion of the study, participants were awarded extra credit points in accordance 
with the procedure set forth by the LSU Psychology Experiments system. 
Informed Consent Process. The study received Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
approval from LSU. The informed consent process explained the participants’ right to decline 
participation and to remain confidential within the research. Parents of adolescent participants 
initially provided informed consent by signing and returning the official Informed Consent 
Release to the investigator. Adolescent assent was obtained through the on-line survey. The 
initial screen of the survey provided information regarding procedure, rights, risks, and benefits 
of participation. Adolescents provided assent by checking a box indicating that they had read and 
understood the conditions of participation and were agreeing to participate. Informed Consent for 
adult participants was conducted solely through the web-based survey as described above.    
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RESULTS 
Analytic Plan 
Three phases of analyses were conducted. First, descriptive analyses were conducted to 
examine unexpected group differences on study instruments by demographic variables as well as 
to evaluate the psychometric properties of internet-administered questionnaires. Next, to test 
Hypothesis 1 a series of four regression analyses were conducted. The final phase of analyses 
included a series of mediation and moderation analyses to test Hypothesis 2.    
To examine the psychometric properties of the internet-administered questionnaires, 
Chronbach’s alpha was calculated for each questionnaire to assess for internal consistency. 
Additionally, correlational analyses were conducted to test for inter-relationships among the 
demographic and worry-related variables and the model components. The variables of interest 
for testing the two study hypotheses included intolerance of uncertainty, negative problem 
orientation, beliefs about worry, cognitive avoidance, and coping (emotional, avoidant). The 
IUS, NPO, WW-II, CAQ, and COPE were used to measure these variables, respectively, because 
they are commonly used and often reported measures of these constructs in the literature. In the 
case of intolerance of uncertainty, the IUS is the only instrument available for assessing the 
construct. Worry as measured by the PSWQ was included in analyses for descriptive purposes 
only.   
 Regression analyses were performed to evaluate the two conceptual models proposed to 
explain how coping abilities influence the relation between age and cognitive components of 
worry. The first model- the mediation model- hypothesized that coping abilities would not 
account for the relationship between age and cognitive components of worry (i.e. cognitive 
avoidance, beliefs about worry). The second model- the moderation hypothesis- hypothesizes 
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that coping abilities acts as a buffer or influences the relationship between age and the cognitive 
components of worry.  
The first conceptual model- the mediation model- was evaluated using analytic 
procedures recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986). A visual portrayal of a mediation model 
is presented in Figure 2. To test for mediation, an initial series of three simple regression 
equations were tested for each cognitive component of worry targeted in the current study. First, 
the criterion variable (cognitive component of worry) was regressed onto the predictor variable 
(age). Second, the mediator variable (coping) was regressed on to the predictor variable (age). 
Third, the criterion variable (cognitive component) was regressed onto the mediator variable 
(coping). Finally, to demonstrate mediation, the criterion variable (cognitive component) was 
regressed onto the predictor variable (age) and the mediator variable (coping) simultaneously. 
Support for the mediating effect occurs when (a) the independent variable is significantly 
associated with the mediating variable, (b) the mediating variable is significantly associated with 
the dependent variable, (c) the independent variable is significantly associated with the 
dependent variable. Evidence for full mediation occurs when paths (a) and (b) are controlled for 
in a fourth regression equation and  the previously significant relation between the predictor and 
the criterion variables is no longer statistically significant (Baron & Kenny, 1986). There is 
evidence of complete mediation if the relationship between the predictor and criterion variables 
is zero after controlling for the mediator variable in the fourth regression analysis or support for 
partial mediation if the significance of the relationship declines. In other words, full or perfect 
mediation is evidenced when the predictor variable no longer has an effect on the 
outcome/dependent variable when the mediator is controlled for (Baron & Kenny, 1986).  
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Figure 2. Mediation Model 
 
To test the moderation model, the effects of the predictor variable (age) on the criterion 
variables (cognitive components of worry; cognitive avoidance and beliefs about worry) was 
hypothesized to change linearly with respect to the moderator variable (COPE; emotional and 
avoidant coping). According to Baron and Kenny (1986), the linear hypothesis is evaluated 
statistically by adding the cross-product (Age x COPE) of the moderator variable (coping) and 
predictor variable (age) to a regression equation that includes the predictor and moderator 
variables as predictors of the criterion variable (cognitive components). A significant moderator 
effect is indicated by a significant effect for the interaction term (Age x COPE) while the 
predictor (age) and the moderator (COPE) variables are controlled statistically (see Figure 3). 
Cohen and Cohen (1983) suggest that the various multiple regression strategies (i.e. 
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simultaneous, sequential, statistical) are appropriate for moderation analysis based on the 
investigator’s conceptual framework.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Moderation Model 
Descriptive Analyses 
Self-report Questionnaires. As all study questionnaires were administered in an on-line 
format, psychometric properties of study instruments were statistically examined. Internal 
consistency and correlations were conducted to examine the psychometric properties of the on-
line format of the study instruments. Table 3 presents means, standard deviations, and internal 
consistency estimates for included questionnaires as well as published means and standard 
deviations for comparison. Data from the current on-line administration was generally consistent 
with published results with two exceptions (CAQ, Avoidant COPE). Additionally, correlations 
between study questionnaires generally reflect observed relationships reported in the literature 
(cf. Dugas, Gosselin, & Ladouceur, 2001; Gosselin et al., 2007; Dugas et al., 2007). 
Relationships among Study Instruments: Pearson Correlations. The relationships 
among study instruments as well as worry level were evaluated by correlation analysis. A 
correlation matrix including all study measures was calculated (see Table 4). Significant 
correlations were present between the PSWQ and all study measures, with the exception of 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent 
Variable 
Moderator 
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Rational and Avoidant coping. All subscales of the COPE significantly correlated with each 
other as expected. Significant correlations ranged from .175 to .654, with a mean of r= .37.   
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics  
 
Scale Observed 
Mean (SD)  
Range Computed Internal 
Consistency 
(Chronbach’s α) 
Adult Published 
Mean (SD)  
Adolescent 
Published Mean 
(SD) 
PSWQ 45.29 (11.55) 19-73 .86 44.77 (10.99) 
  
44.37 (11.34) 
 
IUS 58.78 (19.34) 28-103 .94 54.78 (17.44) 64.00(19.10) 
NPOQ 24.90 (9.13) 12-51 .92 24.78 (9.46)  Not available 
WWII 51.27 (19.51) 25-100 .96 45.89(18.82)  56.25 (16.61) 
CAQ 71.29 (20.97) 25-122 .95 59.16 (18.95) 60.43(11.69) 
Emotion 
Focused 
Coping 
20.28 (5.65) 9-32 .90 19.97 (5.28) Not available 
Problem 
Focused 
Coping 
32.58 (9.17) 0-49 .87 38.29 (8.74) Not available 
Avoidant 
Coping 
21.27 (4.59) 14-34 .68 33.70 (4.74) Not available 
 
Demographic Variables: Analysis of Variance. Initially, , a series of one-way analyses 
of variance (ANOVAs) were performed to determine whether significant differences existed 
between various demographic variables on study instruments. Additionally, demographic 
differences by participant age were calculated due to the inclusion of age as a predictor variable 
in subsequent analyses. Selected demographic variables were gender and race. A series of eight 
ANOVAs were conducted to identify any unpredicted group differences based on gender. 
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Examination of ANOVA results, with a Bonferroni correction (p<.05; .05/8=.006) suggested no 
significant differences by gender were present. A second series of eight ANOVAs examined 
unplanned differences on study instruments by race.   Additionally, differences in participant age 
by race were examined in this series of ANOVAs as well. Results after Bonferroni corrections 
yielded no significant differences by race. Due to the distinct nature of the two recruitment 
methods/sites (i.e. university vs. middle/high-school), a third series of ANOVAs was conducted 
to examine demographic differences between these two sites (i.e. gender and race). Results 
following Bonferroni corrections yielded no significant differences in demographic makeup of 
the recruitment sites.   
Table 4. Pearson Correlations  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. PSWQ 
 
-- .57** .43** .37** .29** .06 .24** .13 
2. IUS 
 
 -- .65** .53** .34** .05 .13 .32** 
3. NPOQ 
 
  -- .46** .41** -.23** .04 .55** 
4. WW-II 
 
   -- .31** .27** .07 .31** 
5. CAQ 
 
    -- .05 .20* .36** 
6. Rational Coping 
 
     -- .18* -.18* 
7. Emotional Coping 
 
      -- .18* 
8. Avoidant Coping 
 
       -- 
   
Note:  * p<.05, ** p<.01 
 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Prediction of Model Variables by Age 
 A series of simple linear regression analyses were performed to determine the extent to 
which age predicts scores on the four measures of the cognitive components of worry (i.e. IUS, 
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NPOQ, CAQ, WW-II). Due to the increased chance of Type I error with multiple simple 
regressions, Bonferroni corrections were conducted (p=.05/4) for a resulting value of p<.025 
needed for statistical significance. Participant age was entered as the predictor variable with 
scores on the model components (IUS, NPOQ, WW-II, CAQ) entered as dependent variables. 
Analyses failed to yield significant results, suggesting age was not a predictor of intolerance of 
uncertainty, negative problem orientation, beliefs about worry, or cognitive avoidance. These 
results are summarized in Table 5. 
Table 5. Summary Table for Simple Regressions: Prediction of Cognitive Variables by Age 
 
Variable 
 
R
2 F B SE B β p 
IUS 
 
.03 4.9 1.09 .49 .18 .03 
NPOQ 
 
.01 1.2 .26 .24 .09 .27 
WW-II 
 
.00 .02 .07 .51 .01 .89 
CAQ 
 
.01 .93 .52 .54 .08 .34 
Note:  * p<. 025 
Hypothesis 2: Testing for Mediation and Moderation 
 It was hypothesized that use of coping strategies would serve as a moderator of the 
relationship between age and scores on measures of cognitive avoidance and positive beliefs 
about worry rather than mediating the relationships. More specifically, it was predicted that the 
relationship between age and cognitive avoidance or beliefs about worry would be stronger at 
lower levels of self-reported coping as compared to the relationship between age and cognitive 
avoidance at higher levels of coping.  
Mediation Analyses. Based on previous research, cognitive avoidance and beliefs about 
worry were used as dependent variables in the mediational models. Two forms of coping 
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(emotional and avoidant) were hypothesized as potential mediators of the relationship between 
age and the dependent variables, resulting in four mediational models. The four proposed 
mediation models are portrayed in Figures 4-7. Per the guidelines presented by Baron and Kenny 
(1986) and Holmbeck (1997), each mediation model was initially tested through a series of three 
standard regression equations.   
The Relationship between Age and Cognitive Avoidance/Beliefs about Worry. The first 
step in establishing mediation was to examine whether the predictor variable (age) was 
significantly related to the outcomes of cognitive avoidance and beliefs about worry. Standard 
regression analyses indicated that age was not a significant predictor for either cognitive 
avoidance, F (1, 151)=.93, p>.05 or beliefs about worry, F (1, 151)= .02, p>.05. Therefore, the 
first step in both of the mediation models was not significant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Model of the Analysis of Avoidant Coping as Mediator Between Age and 
Cognitive Avoidance 
 
The Relationship between Age and Coping. The second step in establishing mediation 
was to examine the relationship between the predictor variable of age and the mediator variables 
of avoidant and emotional coping. Standard regression analyses indicated that age was not a 
Age 
Avoidant 
Coping  
Cognitive 
Avoidance 
β= .08 
β= .36*** 
β= -.05 
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significant predictor for either avoidant coping, F (1, 151)=.35, p>.05 or emotional coping, F (1, 
151)=1.80, p>.05. Therefore, the second step of both the mediation models was not significant.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Model of the Analysis of Emotional Coping as Mediator Between Age and 
Cognitive Avoidance 
 
The Relationship between Coping and Cognitive Avoidance/Beliefs about Worry. The 
third set of equations examined the relationship between the proposed mediator variables and the 
dependent variables. Four separate analyses were conducted (i.e. one each for the relationship of 
avoidant coping-cognitive avoidance, emotional coping-cognitive avoidance, avoidant coping-
beliefs about worry, emotional coping-beliefs about worry). The equation regressing cognitive 
avoidance onto avoidant coping was significant, F (1, 151)=22.89, p<.01 as well was the 
equation regressing cognitive avoidance onto emotional coping, F (1, 151)=6.11, p<.01. 
Avoidant coping was found to significantly predict beliefs about worry (as measured by the 
WW-II), F (1, 151)=16.16, p<.01. Emotional coping did not significantly predict beliefs about 
worry, F (1, 151)=.70, p>.05. In summary, for step three of the mediation analyses, three of the 
four equations reached statistical significant (with the exception of emotional coping-beliefs 
about worry).  
Tests of Mediation. As a result of the non-significant findings in steps one and two of the 
mediational tests, further analyses would be inappropriate given the independent/predictor 
Age 
Emotional 
Coping  
Cognitive 
Avoidance 
β= .08 
β= .20** 
β= .11 
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Figure 6. Model of the Analysis of Avoidant Coping as Mediator Between Age and Beliefs 
About Worry 
 
variable of age was not shown to be significantly associated with either the outcome or mediator 
variables. See Figures 4-7 and Table 6 for summary of mediational analyses. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Model of the Analysis of Emotional Coping as Mediator Between Age and Beliefs 
About Worry 
 
Moderation Analyses. For the current analyses, sequential/hierarchical multiple 
regression will be employed, with the predictor and moderator variables entered simultaneously 
in Step 1 of the equation and the interaction term (Age x COPE) entered in the subsequent step. 
Based on the previous analyses, it is known that age, in isolation, does not significantly predict 
the cognitive components of worry as investigated in the current study. Additionally, the main 
Age 
Beliefs about 
Worry 
β= .07 β= .11 
Age 
Avoidant Coping  
Beliefs about 
Worry 
β= .01 
β= .31*** β= .05 
Emotional 
Coping  
β= .01 
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effects for the predictor and moderator are not of direct importance to the moderation hypothesis 
(Baron & Kenny, 1983). 
Table 6. Summary of Regression Analyses for Testing Mediation Models 
 
Model Predictor Criterion  β 0t F 
Avoidant coping 
mediates 
cognitive 
avoidance 
Age 
Age 
Avoidant Coping 
CAQ 
Avoidant 
Coping 
CAQ 
.08 
-.05 
.36 
.96 
-.58 
4.79*** 
.93 
.35 
22.89*** 
Emotional coping 
mediates 
cognitive 
avoidance 
Age 
Age 
Emotional Coping 
CAQ 
Emotional 
Coping 
CAQ 
.08 
.11 
.20 
.96 
1.35 
2.47** 
.93 
1.8 
6.11** 
Avoidant coping 
mediates beliefs 
about worry 
Age 
Age 
Avoidant Coping 
WW-II 
Avoidant 
Coping 
WW-II 
.01 
-.05 
.31 
.13 
-.58 
4.02*** 
.02 
.35 
16.16*** 
Emotional coping 
mediates beliefs 
about worry 
Age 
Age 
Emotional Coping 
WW-II 
Emotional 
Coping 
WW-II 
.01 
.11 
.07 
.13 
1.35 
.84 
.02 
1.8 
.70 
Note:  * p<.05, **p<.01. ***p<.001 
  
Four multiple regression analyses were conducted to examine the moderation hypotheses, 
and predictors and proposed moderator variables were centered to reduce multicollinearity with 
the interaction term (see Aiken & West, 1991). In these regression equations, the age (predictor) 
and coping (moderator) were entered simultaneously in Step 1, and the cross-product 
(interaction) of age and the moderator was entered on the second step. Consistent with 
suggestions provided by Aiken and West (1991) and Holmbeck (2002), significant interactions 
were more closely examined with the use of post-hoc probing of simple effects.  
 Three of the four hierarchical multiple regression analyses examining moderation of the 
age-cognitive component of worry relationship were significant. Emotional coping was not 
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found to serve as a moderator of the relationship between age and beliefs about worry (see Table 
7 for summary of all moderation models).   
 The regression equation testing the moderation hypothesis that avoidant coping 
moderates the relationship between age and cognitive avoidance was found to be statistically 
significant, F (3, 149)=9.90, p<.001, and explained 17% of the variance in cognitive avoidance. 
The interaction term, Age x Avoidant Coping, was further evaluated to determine if avoidant 
coping is a moderator variable for the relation between age and cognitive avoidance and was 
found to be statistically significant, β=-.16, p<.05, while controlling for the main effects of age 
and avoidant coping. More specifically, while results revealed no significant main effect for age 
(t=.82, ns), a significant main effect for avoidant coping (t=4.84, p<.001) and the Age x 
Avoidant Coping interaction (R2 change=.025, p<.001) in the prediction of cognitive avoidance 
was demonstrated. Post-hoc analyses (Holmbeck, 2002) revealed that age is significantly related 
to cognitive avoidance only in individuals with lower levels of avoidant coping (t=2.29, p<.05), 
but not in individuals with high levels of self reported avoidant coping (See Table 7, Figure 8). 
The prediction of cognitive avoidance by age does in fact depend on the level of avoidant 
coping, but only for individuals with low levels of reported avoidant coping. This finding 
provides empirical support for the moderation model that avoidant coping influences the 
relationship between age and cognitive avoidance. 
 The regression equation testing the moderation hypothesis that emotional coping 
moderates the relationship between age and cognitive avoidance was found to be statistically 
significant, F (3, 149)=3.24, p<.05, and explained 6% of the variance in cognitive avoidance. 
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Figure 8. Interaction of Age and Avoidant Coping on Cognitive Avoidance 
 
The interaction term, Age X Emotional Coping, was evaluated to determine if emotional coping 
is a moderator variable for the relation between age and cognitive avoidance and was not found 
to be statistically significant, β=-.15, p>.05, while controlling for the main effects of age 
and emotional coping. More specifically, while results did reveal a main effect for emotional 
coping (t=2.49, p<.05); neither a main effect for age (t=.054, ns) nor a significant Age x 
Emotional Coping interaction (R2 change=.02, ns) in the prediction of cognitive avoidance was 
not found. Although the model including the interaction term was statistically significant, a non-
significant R2 change, suggests the interaction does not account for a significant amount of 
variance above and beyond the main effects of age and emotional coping (see Table 7). This 
finding failed to find empirical support for the moderation model that emotional coping 
influences the strength or direction of the relationship between age and cognitive avoidance. 
The regression equation testing the moderation hypothesis that avoidant coping 
moderates the relationship between age and beliefs about worry was found to be statistically 
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significant, F(3, 149)=5.36, p<.05, and explained 10% of the variance in beliefs about worry. 
The interaction term, Age x Avoidant Coping, was evaluated to determine if avoidant coping is a 
moderator variable for the relationship between age and beliefs about worry and was not found 
to be statistically significant, β= -.01, p>.05, while controlling for the main effects of age and 
avoidant coping. More specifically, while results did reveal a main effect for avoidant coping 
(t=4.00, p<.001); neither a main effect for age (t=.307, ns) nor a significant Age x Avoidant 
Coping interaction (R2 change=.00, ns) in the prediction of beliefs about worry was not found 
(see Table 7). This finding failed to find empirical support for the moderation model that 
avoidant coping influences the relationship between age  
beliefs about worry.  
The regression equation testing the moderation hypothesis that emotional coping 
moderates the relationship between age and beliefs about worry was not found to be statistically 
significant, F(3, 149)=.41, p>.05, and explained less than 1% of the variance in beliefs about 
worry. Due to the non-significant nature of the overall regression model, further inspection of 
main effects would be inappropriate (see Table 7). This finding failed to find empirical support 
for the moderation model that emotional coping influences the strength or direction of the 
relationship between age and beliefs about worry.  
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Table 7. Summary of Regression Analyses for Testing Moderation Model 
 
Predictor Criterion F R2 ∆R2  β 
 
Age   
Avoidant Coping 
Age x Avoidant Coping 
CAQ 9.90*** .17 .03*  
.06 
.36** 
-.16* 
 
Age   
Emotional Coping 
Age x Emotional Coping 
CAQ 3.24* .06 .02  
.01 
.20* 
-.15 
 
Age   
Avoidant Coping 
Age x Avoidant Coping 
WW-II 5.36* .10 .00  
.02 
.31*** 
-.01 
 
Age   
Emotional Coping 
Age x Emotional Coping 
WW-II .41 .01 .00  
.03 
.06 
.06 
Note:  * p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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DISCUSSION 
 
The main purpose of the present study was to examine the developmental continuity of 
the Dugas model of excessive worry. The first hypothesis, which predicted that age would 
significantly predict cognitive avoidance and beliefs about worry was not supported. The second 
hypothesis, which proposed that coping strategies would serve as a moderator of the relationship 
between age and scores on measures of cognitive avoidance and positive beliefs about worry 
rather than mediating the relationships was partially supported.  
Prediction of Cognitive Components 
As mentioned above, the first hypothesis examined whether participant age could predict 
intolerance of uncertainty, negative problem orientation, cognitive avoidance, or beliefs about 
worry in a sample of adolescents and young adults. This hypothesis was not supported. 
Specifically, the data indicated that age did not significantly predict scores for negative problem 
orientation or on the process measures of interest: cognitive avoidance and beliefs about worry. 
Interestingly, the prediction of intolerance of uncertainty by age neared significance with a p 
value of .03 (p<.025 needed for significance). Accordingly, it can be concluded that the cognitive 
components of worry as laid out by Dugas do not significantly change across this period of 
development as examined in the current study. These results are somewhat consistent with 
previous research in that Laugesen et al. (2003) demonstrated that relationships between the 
cognitive variables and worry mirrored those found in adults with the exception of cognitive 
avoidance and beliefs about worry, though without direct comparison of the model between the 
two groups conclusions cannot be drawn.   
Although age in an adolescent and adult sample may simply not play a role in the 
prediction of the cognitive components of worry, a possible explanation for the findings may be 
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the methodology used. In the current study participant age was used as a proxy variable for 
cognitive development. Based on the research supporting changes in the ability to conceptualize 
and anticipate future events across the lifespan, and specifically within the adolescent to adult 
transition, the current study tested the hypothesis that cognitive development, as measured by 
age, would predict the cognitive components of worry.   
Based on Vasey’s (1993) conceptualization of anxiety in youth and LaBouvie-Vief’s 
theory of post-formal cognitive development, it follows that the cognitive aspect of anxiety, 
worry, will become more prevalent as individuals’ develop more advanced cognitive abilities 
through the developmental period of adolescence. It appears that both cognitive processes such 
as worry and cognitive content such as negative self-talk or automatic thoughts are sensitive to 
changes in a child’s cognitive development (Vasey et al., 1994; Muris, Merckelbach, & Liutjen, 
2002; Muris, Merckelbach, Meesters et al., 2002). Given the current study focused on a 
constricted age range of 13 to 25 year-olds, it is possible that such changes in cognitive abilities 
occur outside of the selected range or alternatively that age is not an appropriate proxy for 
cognitive development. 
The Role of Coping 
 The second hypothesis explored the possible mediating and moderating roles of coping 
abilities on the relationship between age and cognitive avoidance as well as between age and 
beliefs about worry. The hypothesis that coping abilities would moderate, rather than mediate, 
the relationship between age and the cognitive variables was partially supported. Specifically, 
due to the non-significant prediction of outcome variables (i.e. coping, cognitive avoidance, and 
beliefs about worry) by the predictor variable of age mediation of the relationship between age 
and the measures of cognitive avoidance and beliefs about worry was not found.   
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Interestingly, avoidant coping was found to significantly predict both cognitive avoidance 
and beliefs about worry whereas emotional coping was found to only predict cognitive 
avoidance. Accordingly, avoidant coping demonstrated predictive value for both cognitive 
avoidance and beliefs about worry whereas emotional coping demonstrated predictive value for 
cognitive avoidance. In previous studies with adolescent samples, emotion-focused coping was 
found to be positively related to symptoms of anxiety and depression (Compas, Malcarne, and 
Fondacaro, 1988). The current findings add evidence that emotion focused coping strategies are 
related to specific maladaptive cognitive processes (i.e. cognitive avoidance) involved in anxiety. 
 Regarding the moderational analyses, although  emotional coping was not found to be a 
moderator for the age-cognitive avoidance or age-beliefs about worry relationships or for the role 
of avoidant coping for the age-beliefs about worry relationship; avoidant coping was found to 
moderate the relationship between age and cognitive avoidance. This finding supports an 
interaction between age and avoidant coping in the prediction of the cognitive process variable 
examined. Specifically, a significant positive relationship was observed between age and 
cognitive avoidance at lower levels of coping, whereas a negative, although insignificant, trend 
was observed at higher levels of avoidant coping. In essence, at lower levels of avoidant coping, 
the relationship between age and cognitive avoidance was more salient. 
Specifically, the relationship between cognitive avoidance and age was only significant 
for lower levels of avoidant coping. Low reported levels of avoidant coping were associated with 
a significant positive relationship between age and cognitive avoidance. This particular pattern of 
results provides partial support for the moderating role of coping in the relationship between age 
(as a proxy for cognitive development) and the cognitive component of worry, more specifically 
of cognitive avoidance. These results suggest that at higher levels of avoidant coping, a 
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relationship does not exist between age and cognitive avoidance that is otherwise present in 
lower levels of avoidant coping. Importantly, this is a main goal of developmental 
psychopathology, to determine various developmental trajectories for maturation. 
Potentially, this finding that cognitive avoidance increases with age in individuals with 
lower levels of avoidant coping may be related to these individual’s behavioral responses when 
faced with stressful, uncertain, or emotionally laden situations. Based on previous research 
previous research (cf. Compas et al., 1988; Garnefski et al., 2001; Garnefski et al, 2002) and 
current findings, there is a negative correlation or inverse relationship between the use of 
avoidant coping strategies and more rational, behavioral approach coping strategies.  In the 
current study, a negative correlation was found between avoidant coping and rational coping (r=-
.18, p<.01). Therefore it may be assumed that individuals who are low in avoidant coping 
strategies may actually engage in more rational coping strategies and approach problems or 
stressful situations with adaptive, activate coping strategies. In theory, these individuals who are 
low in the use of avoidant coping strategies may behaviorally engage in the face of uncertainty or 
fully approach problem or stressful situations, they may engage in higher levels of cognitive 
avoidance to refrain from experiencing the negative emotions associated with such situations. As 
such, individuals who are low in avoidant behaviors may continually engage in approach 
behaviors and enter environments that are stressful and worry provoking. Mowrer’s (1960) two-
factor theory of the acquisition and maintenance of fear can help explain this possible paradigm. 
Although they are behaviorally approaching these stressful or emotion-inducing environments 
they may be utilizing cognitive avoidance to refrain from becoming emotionally aroused. As 
such, the use of cognitive avoidance strategies is reinforced over time by the prevention of 
emotional arousal and individuals will be more likely to engage in cognitive avoidance when 
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entering stressful situations in the future. Overtime, the reinforcing property of avoidance of 
negative emotions is strengthened and the individuals continue, and possibly increase, the use of 
cognitive avoidance strategies when faced with stressful or worry provoking situations.  The 
developmental period assessed in this project, namely adolescence and young adulthood, is a 
period in which an individual must face a number of changes and stress. Many of these changes 
are unavoidable, such as physical development and educational/vocational transitions. When 
faced with such unavoidable stressful or worry provoking situations, individuals may engage in 
cognitive avoidance strategies to decrease their level of emotional discomfort (Gosselin et al., 
2007). In such situations, individuals are not able to utilize more behaviorally based avoidant 
coping strategies and may engage in cognitive avoidance strategies to avoid and escape the 
experience of negative emotional states (i.e. worry and anxiety). As such, through the negative 
reinforcement of cognitive avoidance and the continued approach and confrontation of stressful 
situations, cognitive avoidance increases throughout the developmental period of adolescence 
and young adulthood. Further examination of the role of rational coping in the current data may 
shed light on this hypothesized process.   
The lack of significant findings for the prediction of cognitive variables by age may be that 
even though the two specific groups sampled are both facing changes in life responsibilities, 
important choices that influence their future, and other significant life stressors the impact of 
these changes and stressors are experienced similarly across the developmental stages sampled. 
Adolescents are facing physical and emotional development as well as increased autonomy. 
Additionally, adolescents are faced with conflicts and choices that accompany greater 
independence. Young adults also face a new found freedom and additional responsibility as well 
as important decisions regarding their future including their education, vocation, and marital 
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status. It is possible that when adolescents and young adults are faced with worry and anxiety 
regarding these responsibilities and choices, they rely on avoidant coping as well as cognitive 
avoidance to decrease their discomfort. Research reported by Stöber and Joorman (2001) found 
that worry, both everyday and clinical worry, was significantly correlated to behavior and 
decisional procrastination. This finding, along with the Gosselin et al. (2007) finding that 
adolescent report of avoidance of unpleasant thought provoking stimuli is predictive of non-
clinical worry, suggests that cognitive avoidance may serve a coping functioning through actual 
behavioral procrastination. Future research should examine and attempt to parse out the role of 
cognitive avoidance in terms of coping and procrastination behavior as it relates to worry.   
Limitations 
 A few important cautions should be applied to the results of the present study. First, 
although all questionnaires used in this study have been validated in adult samples, explicit 
examination of the psychometric properties of the questionnaires in adolescent populations is 
lacking. Previous research (Laugesen et al., 2003; Gosselin et al., 2007) has reported internal 
consistency and preliminary reliability of IUS, CAQ, and WW-II and the current study examined 
these properties as well. Internal consistency of study questionnaires within the sample of 
adolescent participants was acceptable (Chronbachs α=.92-.96). Unfortunately, the significant 
moderational findings were based on two instruments which did not conform to published 
standards (i.e. CAQ, Avoidant COPE). The mean for the CAQ in the current study was 71.29 
(SD 20.97) whereas published research reports means of M=59.16(18.95) and M=60.43(11.29) 
(cf. Gosselin et al., 2007; Sexton & Dugas, in press). Important to note is that these two studies 
are the only available studies examining the CAQ in non-clinical samples, therefore the 
discrepancy between the observed means in the current study and published means should be 
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interpreted with caution. Additionally, the observed mean for the Avoidant COPE (M=21.27) 
appeared to be discrepant from reported means by Lyne and Roger (2000; M=33.70). 
Importantly, Lyne and Roger (2000) present the only available adult data based on the revised 
scoring key of the COPE and no published psychometric data are available for the COPE in an 
adolescent sample. The current study adds to the research literature by providing information 
regarding psychometric properties of these measures in a cross-sectional samples of adolescents 
and young adults. 
In addition to the lack of psychometric data for such instruments in adolescent samples, 
the current study utilized an internet methodology. Although no data currently exists for the 
reliability or validity of the current study questionnaires in an internet-administered form, 
research on internet administration of self-report inventories suggest that reliable and valid data 
are gathered (Buchanan, 2000) and that psychometric properties of traditional questionnaires are 
typically replicated although not identical (Buchanan & Smith, 1999). When data has been 
available for paper-and-pencil versions of online instruments, research has shown that the online 
questionnaires do assess the same constructs as the traditional paper versions (Carlbring et al., 
2007). In cases of instruments that have only an internet version available, there is evidence that 
the online instruments possess construct validity (Buchanan & Smith, 1999; Buchanan, 2000; 
Carlbring et al., 2007) in that they measure the traits proposed. Internal consistency of the study 
instruments was evaluated and found to be acceptable. Also, correlations between study 
instruments mirrored those reported in the literature utilizing paper-and-pencil administration of 
questionnaires.  
A final limitation of the current study may be the restricted age range as assessed. The 
restricted range observed in the dependent variables (outcomes) may be attributable to the 
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restricted range of predictors (age range: 12-24 years) rather than absence of predictive relations.  
The cognitive development occurring during the developmental period assessed may in fact be a 
period of refinement of cognitive abilities rather than significant gains or changes that is more 
typically seen in late childhood or early adolescence. In fact, the National Institute of Health 
(NIH) and the World Health Organization (WHO) both recognize a larger age range as 
encompassing “adolescence” than is typically presented in the research literature. All individuals 
ages 21 years and younger are classified as ‘child’ participants for NIH related research and 
purposes (NIH, 1998) whereas WHO recognizes individuals between the ages of 10 and 24 years 
as young people (Goodburn & Ross, 1995). Additionally, WHO specifies the period of 
adolescence of encompassing the ages of 10 through 19 years.   
Future Directions 
 This study has important implications for both future research and for the development 
and administration of clinical programs for the prevention and treatment of excessive worry in 
adolescents and young adults. Given the lack of significant findings in the current study 
regarding the prediction of the cognitive components of worry by age in an adolescent to young 
adult sample, one could suggest that it is not necessary to continue to separate adolescents from 
young adults in research investigating worry, at least in studies examining non-clinical worry. 
However, this would be premature based on these limited findings. Also, the question remains 
that if there is no developmental variance in the cognitive components of worry or in the 
expression of non-clinical worry, are differences present in cases of clinical or excessive worry? 
Future studies should address the interactions between developmental factors, worry, and the 
cognitive components of worry in clinical samples (i.e. those diagnosed with GAD) that vary 
across the lifespan.  
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 An area lacking within the literature is in the prospective prediction of adult worry from 
adolescent worry. Preliminary evidence suggests that clinical levels of worry begin to develop 
within the late adolescent period (Dugas et al., 1998; Rapee, 1991). Approximately 50 percent of 
adults seeking treatment for GAD report that their problematic worry began in childhood or 
adolescence, but the proportion of children or adolescents with this disorder who retain such 
difficulties into adulthood is unknown. (Noyes, Clancey, Hoenk, & Slymen, 1980). Given these 
reports of childhood worries continuing into adulthood and morphing into more impairing 
clinical symptoms, additional research is needed on the process involved in the development of 
excessive or maladaptive worry across the lifespan.   
Concluding Remarks 
 
 A plethora of evidence exists citing differences between adolescents and adults in terms 
of life events, stress, coping abilities, and cognitive abilities but just as much research also exists 
blurring the lines between adolescents and adults. The current study sought to examine the 
developmental continuity of four variables posited to contribute to the development and 
maintenance of worry in adolescents and adults. Even though previous research has tested this 
model in the two age groups separately and found disparate results, there may not be a need to 
separate the groups for further examination of this model. Using age as analogous to cognitive 
development, this study failed to find predictive value of age for the cognitive variables 
hypothesized to contribute to worry. Although age failed to significantly predict outcomes on 
intolerance of uncertainty, negative problem orientation, cognitive avoidance, or beliefs about 
worry, moderation analyses suggested that coping, specifically avoidant coping, interacts with 
age to predict cognitive avoidance.   
Taken together, the results of the current study and those of previous researchers (i.e. 
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Laugesen et al., 2003; Gosselin et al., 2007) suggest that the cognitive-behavioral model of 
worry (Dugas et al., 1998) can be effectively applied to adolescents and that the principle 
components of the model do not vary across the adolescent to young adult developmental period. 
However, an important discovery was the interaction between a developmental variable (i.e. age) 
and avoidant coping in the prediction of cognitive avoidance. Such findings suggest that at 
younger ages coping strategies may be a protective factor (or vulnerability) for cognitive 
avoidance and in turn for worry. Future research should continue to investigate the role 
cognitive, social, and emotional development as well as experienced life events and transitions in 
the development of worry across the lifespan. 
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